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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TRAVIS E. TELFORD, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 950560 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction by jury of murder, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Section 76-5-203 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), in the First Judicial District Court in and for 
Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, 
presiding. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994) . 
The Utah Supreme Court exercised its discretion and poured this 
case over to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 78-2-
2(d)(i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to grant defendant's 
motion to suppress the letters he wrote while incarcerated in the 
Box Elder County Jail? 
Standard of Review: The appellate courts will disturb a trial 
1 
court's factual findings on a motion to suppress evidence only if 
those findings are clearly erroneous, but reviews a court's legal 
conclusions based upon those findings under a nondeferential 
correction of error standard. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1270-71 & n. 11 (Utah 1993) ; State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 981 
(Utah App. 1992); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah 
App. 1992) . 
2. Did the trial court's failure to grant the motions to 
sever the defendants' joint trial violate Utah Code Annotated 
Section 77-8a-l (1953 as amended), and thereby violate defendant's 
right to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, his right to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and under Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, and his right against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are a question of 
law, and the trial court's determination of questions of law are 
given no deference and are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2nd 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). A denial of a motion 
to sever will be reversed only if defendant affirmatively shows 
that his or her right to a fair trial has been impaired. State 
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 445 & n. 10 (Utah 1986); State v. 
O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986). When the error amounts to a 
violation of a defendant's right of confrontation, reversal is 
2 
required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). 
3. Did the trial court violate defendant's state and federal 
constitutional rights, as noted below, by redacting his statement 
to a police officer and limiting the scope of cross-examination of 
the state's witness concerning the redacted statement? (Right to 
due process of law under the Fifth Amendment, United States 
Constitution and under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution; right against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment, United States Constitution and under Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah State Constitution; right to confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution and under Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution; and right to assistance 
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution 
and under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution). 
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are a question of 
law, and the trial court's determination of questions of law are 
given no deference and are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2nd 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). A trial court's legal 
conclusions will be reversed only if shown to be clearly erroneous. 
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The defendant identifies the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules as those "whose 
interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6): 
1 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or the 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law, nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT XIV SECTION 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
4 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; no deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 SECTION 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 SECTION 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusations against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 SECTION 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 SECTION 15 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. S 77-8A-1. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(2) (b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if they are alleged to 
have participated in the same act or conduct or in the 
same criminal episode. 
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(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged 
with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the 
court in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders 
separate trials consistent with the interests of 
justice. 
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or 
defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an 
election of separate trials or separate counts, grant a 
severance of defendants, or provide other relief as 
justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or 
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least 
five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by 
defendant for severance, the court may order the 
prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the 
defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at 
the trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and codefendant were both charged by information, 
dated March 31, 1994, with one count of murder, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-203 (R. 
at 1). Defendant first appeared in court on April 1, 1994 (R. at 
14) . A preliminary hearing was held on May 27, 1994 and both 
defendants were bound over for arraignment (R. at 38). A motion 
to sever was filed by the codefendant and was denied after a 
hearing held on September 19, 1994 (R. at 281 line 3-4). A joint 
trial was originally scheduled to commence September 26, 1994 (R. 
at 248 line 7-13). The trial was rescheduled to commence January 
9, 1995, pursuant to a motion to continue (R. at 153) . On 
December 20, 1994, the trial was again continued to April 3, 1995, 
pursuant to defendant's motion (R. at 179). 
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A joint trial was held before a jury from April 3-11, 1995. 
On the first day of trial, April 3, 1995, defendant moved to sever 
the trials. This motion was denied (R. at 212) . On April 5, 1995, 
the codefendant renewed his motion to sever. The motion was denied 
(R. at 213) . On April 6, and again on April 7, 1995, the 
codefendant renewed his motion to sever. The motions were denied 
(R. at 213) . 
Defendant was found guilty on April 11, 1995 (R. at 216), and 
was sentenced on May 30, 1995 (R. at 227) . A Motion for New Trial 
and for Arrest of Judgment was filed June 7, 1995 (R. at 228), and 
was denied on June 29, 1995 (R. at 235). Notice of Appeal was 
filed on July 6, 1995 (R. at 237) . The case was poured over from 
the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. at 243). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Travis Telford and his codefendant, Brandon 
Dahlguist, both knew each other and the victim, Troy Weston, whom 
they were convicted of murdering (R. at 1156 line 23 to 1157 line 
4; 1167 line 10-13). Troy Weston was engaged in selling diluted 
or "weak" drugs (R. at 1161 line 19 to 1162 line 6; 1783 line 15-
20). The two defendants were involved in an altercation with the 
victim approximately one week before his death because he was 
selling "weak drugs" (R. at 1161 line 20 to 1162 line 5; 1167 line 
10-14) . 
On the morning of March 12, 1994, the victim's father (with 
whom the victim lived) saw two males pick the victim up at his 
Riverdale home in a Chevrolet Blazer which was registered to 
7 
defendant Dahlquist's father. The Blazer was occasionally driven 
by Dahlquist (R. at 1239 line 2 to 1240 line 24; 1242 line 6 to 
1244 line 23) . 
Sometime that same day, defendant Telford's sister, Jennifer 
Colantonio, saw Telford, Dahlquist and another male in the Blazer 
in the parking lot of Paramount Bowl in Ogden. There is a Kar Kwik 
convenience store near there. Ms. Colantonio estimated this third 
male, unknown to her at the time, to be between the ages of twenty 
(20) and thirty (30) years old (R. at 1434 line 23 to 1435 line 15; 
1446 line 7 to 1450 line 1). 
Douglas Cannon, Ms. Colantonio's bishop, testified that he met 
with her on March 12, 1994 between 11:15 and 11:30 a.m. at his 
place of business, Godfather's Pizza. There is a Kar Kwik 
convenience store directly across the street from Godfather's 
Pizza. Mr. Cannon testified that Ms. Colantonio waved to someone 
in a passing car and told Mr. Cannon that it was her brother (R. 
at 1325 line 2 to 1326 line 5; 1328 line 9 to 1329 line 16). 
Ms. Colantonio was shown an obituary photograph of the victim 
by a police officer, and she seemed to identify the victim as the 
person she'd seen in the Blazer (R. at 1454 line 10 to 1455 line 
18) . Later, however, Ms. Colantonio admitted that she couldn't say 
for certain whether it was the same person she had seen in the 
Blazer on March 12, 1994 (R. at 1462 line 4-25), and she wasn't 
even sure which day it was she saw the two defendants in the Blazer 
8 
because she was "high" (R. at 1465 line 24 to 1466 line 3). 
A Blazer matching a description of the Dahlquist Blazer was 
seen near Willard Bay at approximately 11:30 a.m. on March 12, 
1994, by a Michael Chulick. Mr. Chulick observed three Caucasian 
males in the vehicle, two sitting in the front and one sitting in 
the rear (R. at 1283 line 12 to 1287 line 4). While Mr. Chulick 
was working his dogs approximately two to three hundred yards from 
where the Blazer was parked, he heard small-caliber fire coming 
from the direction of the Blazer. The shooting appeared to occur 
in "a target shooting pattern, of somebody shooting clips of ammo 
fairly quickly and then having to pause to reload" (R. at 1288 line 
19 to 1290 line 11) . 
After approximately ten to fifteen minutes of shooting (R. at 
1299 line 7 to 11) , Mr. Chulick "heard some shots and what sounded 
like a cry or a scream." Mr. Chulick then looked over in the 
direction of the Blazer and "saw two people run to the vehicle and 
then run away from the vehicle and then back to the vehicle and 
peel out" (R. at 1291 line 6 to line 12) . Mr. Chulick gathered up 
his dogs and proceeded to the area where the shooting had occurred. 
There he observed four items set up as targets (a Mountain Dew 
bottle, a Lime Away bottle, a Marlboro hard pack cigarette box, and 
a Chips Ahoy box) (R. at 1294 line 16 to 1295 line 12) . Mr. 
Chulick apparently noticed nothing else and loaded his dogs into 
his truck and took them to another area to swim (R. at 1297 line 
2-7) . 
1
 Page 1465 of the record, as paginated, should actually be 
page 1466. There are currently two (2) pages numbered 1465. 
a 
The two defendants went to the home of Ed Mitchell to have the 
Blazer painted either in the morning or around noon on March 12, 
1994 (R. at 1342 line 17 to 1342 line 25; 1344 line 18-22; 1346 
line 6-21). 
At approximately 2:20 to 2:30 p.m. on March 12, 1994, Dee and 
Judy Spinden were out for a drive in the vicinity of Willard Bay 
and decided to pull over and let their dog out. Mrs. Spinden had 
the dog on a leash and it pulled her toward an area where she 
discovered the victim's body. The Spinden1s then contacted the 
police (R. at 923 line 14 to 925 line 22; 929 line 14-17). 
Pursuant to an investigation, defendant Telford was arrested 
and charged with murder on or about March 31, 1994 (R. at 1; 10a) . 
While in custody, defendant wrote several incriminating letters, 
excerpts of which were read to the jury (R. at 1762 line 19 to 1766 
line 13). Counsel filed a motion to suppress those letters (as 
well as other statements) (R. at 93). A hearing was held on the 
motion on September 20, 1994, and the trial court denied the motion 
as it pertained to the letters (R. at 375 line 3-10) . 
On or about April 14, 1994, defendant made a statement to 
Riverdale City Police Detective Dave Hansen while being transported 
from Riverdale to Brigham City. Later, the court ordered that the 
statement (as well as others) be redacted to exclude any reference 
to codefendant Dahlquist's name or existence (R. at 546 line Il-
ls) . The statement, as read to the jury in its redacted form by 
Detective Hansen, was as follows: 
On April 14, 1994, while en route to Box 
Elder County jail with prisoner Travis 
Telford, he told me about the day of the 
homicide of Troy Weston. 
• * * 
10. 
About 4:15 while on 1-15 en route to the 
jail, Travis, without being asked, started to 
talk about the homicide of Troy Weston. He 
said that Troy had inquired about buying a gun 
because he had some people who wanted to hurt 
him. He said he went and picked up Troy 
Weston at his house and headed out to Willard 
to show him the gun. 
He said that when he and Troy arrived out 
in Willard out came a small automatic .22 
caliber handgun. He said that they had parked 
on the side of the road to shoot. They then 
got out and went over to shoot the gun and 
Troy asked how did it work. Travis ^said that 
when Troy asked if it worked, he was shot in 
the shoulder. He said Troy screamed and said 
what are you doing. Troy then was shot again. 
This time twice in the back, because Troy's 
body had then shifted sideways. 
He then said Troy continued to yell to 
stop it. He then said that one of the bullets 
must have hit Troy's spine because he quit 
moving and just dropped to the ground. Troy 
was then shot again twice more in the front 
and the gun jammed. He said it either jammed 
or ran out of ammunition. Travis went back to 
the Blazer and got another clip. When he got 
back to the Blazer the new clip was loaded and 
the gun was placed under Troy's chin and the 
trigger pulled one last time. He then said 
Troy did not move anymore and he dragged the 
body about 30 feet to the ditch. He then got 
back to the Blazer and sped back to Ogden. 
(Sic). 
(R. at 1407 line 2 to 1410 line 14). 
At trial, defendant Telford objected to the admission of the 
redacted statement, and requested to be allowed to ask Detective 
Hansen on cross-examination if the statement is a complete 
representation of what the defendant had told him. The court 
disallowed that question (R. at 1390 line 2 to 1397 line 25) . The 
codefendant then moved for severance,2 arguing that the problem of 
2The codefendant originally filed a motion to sever on 
August 31, 1994. This is not included in the record in this 
case, but can be found in the companion case of State v. 
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the redacted statement and cross-examination of such are 
illustrations of why the trials should be severed (R. at 1395 line 
14 to 1397 line 3) . Counsel for defendant Telford added that under 
Rule 403 Utah Rules of Evidence the statement should not be allowed 
in its redacted form because it would be misleading to the jury (R. 
at 1397 line 4-17) . 
On the first day of trial, April 3, 1995, defendant renewed 
his motion to sever (R. at 777 line 18-23) . The trial court denied 
the motion (R. at 781 line 17-18) . The defendants were tried 
jointly before a jury from April 3-11, 1995, and they were both 
convicted on April 11, 1995 (R. at 2345 line 18 to 2346 line 3). 
Defendant was sentenced on May 30, 1995, to a term of five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison for murder, a felony of the first 
degree, plus an indeterminate term of one to five years for the 
firearm enhancement, to run consecutive to the sentence for murder 
(R. at 2386 line 19 to 2387 line 16). The defendant now appeals 
from his conviction. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Copies of letter obtained from the defendant while 
incarcerated in the Box Elder County Jail should have been 
suppressed because they were obtained in violation of his 
constitutional right to privacy. While prisoners in the Box Elder 
County Jail are on notice that their mail will be scanned before 
sent, they are not on notice that their mail will be copied and 
forwarded to the county attorney's office. 
Dahlquist. The motion was denied. (R. at 281 line 3-4). 
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The regulation and censorship of mail are justified only if 
such action furthers an important or substantial government 
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. There are 
three governmental interests: 1) security, 2) order, and 3) 
rehabilitation. The restriction on inmates1 First Amendment rights 
must be no greater than necessary to protect the asserted 
governmental interest at stake. 
The governmental interest at hand in this case was security 
and order. There was no indication that the defendant in this case 
was classified as dangerous or an escape risk, or that he was 
attempting to have contraband smuggled into the jail. Once it was 
ascertained that defendant's mail contained no information that 
would present a security risk, jailers were obligated under jail 
policy to seal the envelopes and mail them. 
The trial court erred by refusing to sever the trials. While 
two or more defendants may be tried jointly, trial courts must 
sever the trials if there is any doubt as to whether trying the 
cases jointly would be prejudicial to the rights of the defendants. 
The defendants1 defenses in this case were antagonistic and 
irreconcilable. 
Defendant Telford's defense was that, while he was at the 
murder scene, the codefendant shot and killed the victim. The 
codefendant had received a telephone call informing him that the 
victim was a ,!ratfI (or informant), that there was a $10,000 "hit" 
out on the victim and that the victim was trying to set up a deal 
with the codefendant to get him "busted." The codefendant also 
threatened to kill defendant Telford because he "spilled his guts 
and told everything he knew" about the murder. 
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The codefendant's defense was that he had an alibi. The 
codefendant also informed the trial court of his intention to 
produce evidence that defendant Telford had been seen with a gun 
just hours before the victim was murdered. The trial court was 
presented with sufficient information to apprise it of the 
antagonistic nature of the defenses, and of the prejudicial effect 
on the defendant. 
The defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to 
sever the trials. If the trials had been severed, the defendant's 
statement to Detective Hansen about how the murder occurred would 
have come in in its entirety, and the defendant would not have been 
restricted on cross-examination of the detective. It should have 
severed the trials. In other words, in separate trials the 
defendant would have been able to introduce evidence that would 
tend to exculpate him (evidence that the codefendant murdered the 
victim) through the statement he gave the detective. By trying the 
cases jointly, the only way for defendant Telford to introduce the 
exculpatory evidence would have been to waive his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination and testify. 
The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against him was violated by the admission of the 
redacted statement, as testified to by Detective Hansen, and by the 
preclusion by the court of defense counsel conducting effective 
cross-examination of the detective. The trial court attempted to 
balance the competing constitutional rights of the defendants. 
However, under the circumstances of this case that was impossible. 
The court protected codefendant Dahlquist's Fifth Amendment right 
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him by 
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redacting defendant Telford's statement to Detective Hansen. 
Defendant Telford's right to confront and cross-examine the 
witnesses against him was abrogated by the court's restriction of 
cross-examination on the statement. In this type of case, only one 
defendant can enjoy his constitutional right to confront witnesses. 
The only solution to the problem was to sever the trials. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COPIES OF DEFENDANT'S LETTERS WRITTEN 
WHILE INCARCERATED SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
BECAUSE THEY WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
While incarcerated in the Box Elder County Jail awaiting 
trial, defendant wrote a number of letters to friends and 
acquaintances outside the jail. These letters were intercepted, 
copied and forwarded to the county attorney (R. at 97) . These 
actions violated defendant's rights under the First and Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I Sections XIV and 
XV of the Utah State Constitution. The trial court should have 
granted the motion to suppress the letters. 
The defendant in the California case of People v. Phillips, 
711 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1985), alleged that jail officials violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights by inspecting and copying letters he 
mailed. While the court in Phillips determined that the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the 
reading and copying of the his outgoing mail, the court stated: 
Defendant's letters were inspected for security reasons 
pursuant to regulations that authorized such inspections 
without notice to the prisoner if there were affirmative 
indications that he was dangerous or presented 
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an escape risk. Such inspections are generally 
acknowledged to be reasonable. 
Id. at 456. 
The court went on to note that "[t]he regulations apparently 
provide that, while outgoing mail is not ordinarily monitored, it 
may be inspected if there is some affirmative indication that the 
defendant presents a security problem." Id. 
The defendant in Phillips was determined to be "dangerous" and 
"an escape risk" by the administrative officer, which was the 
reason his letters were read and copied. id. at 456. The 
monitoring of mail at issue in this case was similar to that 
addressed in Phillips. 
The Box Elder County Jail policy on mail is as follows: 
IV.B.b.(2) 
The Staff member picking up the mail will take it to the 
jail booking office where it will be inspected and 
scanned during the afternoon and night duty watch. Upon 
completion, the letters will be sealed. 
(R. at 143). No policy rationale is articulated, but it can only 
be assumed that the above-described procedure is for security 
reasons. 
While prisoners in the Box Elder County Jail are on notice 
that their mail will be scanned before sent, they are not on notice 
that their mail will be copied and forwarded to the county 
attorney's office. In the present case, there was no indication 
that defendant was classified as dangerous or an escape risk, or 
that he was attempting to have contraband smuggled into the jail. 
Once it was ascertained that defendant's mail contained no 
information which would present a security risk, jailers were 
obligated under jail policy to seal the envelopes and mail them. 
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The court in State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105 (Az. 1983), in 
ruling on a similar issue, stated "[p]risoners do retain some 
Fourth Amendment rights, even though incarcerated." id. at 1114. 
The Jeffers court stated that the application of the Fourth 
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can 
claim a justifiable, reasonable, legitimate expectation of privacy 
that has been invaded by the challenged governmental action. Id. 
at 1104. 
The Jeffers case dealt with a defendant who gave a letter to 
the jailer to be delivered to another inmate within the jail. That 
court found that prison officials may inspect and examine the 
communication of inmates without depriving them of their 
constitutional rights, stating that when an inmate voluntarily 
writes a letter and gives it to a guard for delivery to another 
inmate, he cannot reasonably expect the letter to remain private. 
Id. at 1115. 
Though certain correspondence (for example, letters from one 
inmate to another within a jail) is subject to a more stringent 
review, Jeffers is distinguishable, in that the defendant in 
Jeffers could not reasonably expect a letter from himself to 
another inmate to remain private. The implication is that an 
inmate who sends a letter to someone on the outside does reasonably 
expect that such a letter would remain private. As stated above, 
an inmate is not stripped of all Fourth Amendment protection simply 
because he is incarcerated. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U.S. 396 (1974), the Court addressed the extent to which correction 
officials should restrict inmates' mail privileges. In that case, 
17 
the Court recognized that a balance needed to be struck between the 
interference with First Amendment rights of the inmates and the 
security concerns of the facility. The Court reached a balance 
between these two rights with a two-prong test. 
First, the regulation and censorship of mail were justified 
only if such action furthered an important or substantial 
government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. 
Id. at 413. The Court stated that there can be no such regulations 
solely designed to interfere with prisoners' rights of expression. 
The Court delineated three governmental interests, those being 
security, order, and rehabilitation. Id. 
Second, the restriction on the inmates' First Amendment rights 
must be no greater than necessary to protect the asserted 
governmental interest at stake. Id. In Procunier, the Court 
invalidated regulations which authorized the prison staff to censor 
statements from inmate correspondence that "unduly complain" or 
"magnify grievances" or of matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise 
inappropriate." Jd. at 415. 
While it is recognized that incarceration brings about the 
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, when an 
institution infringes upon a specific right guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, the infringement of the right must be weighed against 
the objectives of the correctional facility. 
In the case at hand, the governmental interest, which is 
furthered by mail regulation, would arguably fall under the 
category of prison security and order. Actions by jail personnel 
in regulating and censoring of inmate mail must, however, be no 
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the 
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particular governmental interest involved. Id. at 413. 
The Idaho case of Mallery v. Lewis, 678 P.2d 19 (Idaho, 1983) , 
suggests a compromise and a reasonable method of balancing the 
interests of both the State and the rights of the inmate. One 
issue in Mallery was a similar issue raised in the present case. 
The petitioners alleged that correspondence was opened and censored 
by jail officials, and that mail was withheld without notice to the 
inmate. The trial court in Mallery found that the inmate's general 
correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, was screened by 
officials (i.e., read for basic content and checked for 
contraband). The trial court further found that incoming 
privileged mail was opened in the presence of the inmate and 
checked for contraband. Outgoing privileged mail was sealed and 
not screened. When booked into jail, prisoners were asked to sign 
a consent form, consenting to the screening of general 
correspondence. " If the form was not signed, the mail was not 
screened, but rather held until the inmate's release, id. at 24. 
The Idaho jail policy of having the prisoner sign a consent 
form to allow screening of general correspondence, or, if such form 
was not signed, holding the mail until the inmate's release seems 
to be a reasonable compromise between the First Amendment freedoms 
of the inmate and the governmental interest involved, and, as 
Procunier stated, the limitations of such First Amendment freedoms 
must be no greater than necessary or essential to the protection 
of the particular governmental interest involved. Procunier at 
413. 
The reading, copying and forwarding to the county attorney of 
defendant's mail without reasonable cause to believe that such mail 
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contained evidence of escape attempt, suicide, contraband, or 
inmate-to-inmate correspondence was a violation of defendant's 
rights under the First and Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I Sections 14 and 15 of the Utah State 
Constitution, and the information in said letters should have been 
suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING 
TO SEVER THE TRIALS AND IN SO DOING VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The trial court's failure to grant the motions to sever the 
defendants1 joint trial violated Utah Code Annotated Section 77-8a-
1 (1953 as amended), and thereby violated defendant's right to due 
process of law under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, and under Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah State Constitution, and his right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-8a-2 (1953 as amended) states: 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in 
the same indictment or information if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act 
or conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
* • • 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with any offense, they shall be tried 
jointly unless the court in its discretion on 
motion or otherwise orders separate trials 
consistent with the interests of justice. 
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Section 77-8a-4(a) further states: 
If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses or defendants in an indictment or 
information or by a joinder for trial 
together, the court shall order an election of 
separate trials of separate counts, grant a 
severance of defendants, or provide other 
relief as justice requires. 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 9(d)3 as 
"requirfingl separate trials if it appears that the defendants will 
be prejudiced by joinder." State v. Ellis, 748 P. 2d 188, 190 (Utah 
1987)(emphasis added). 
A denial of severance will be reversed only if a defendant's 
right to a fair trial has been impaired. State v. Collins, 612 
P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 
(Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978); State v. 
Rivenburgh, 355 P.2d 689, 698 (Utah 1960), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 
922 (1961). A trial court's doubt whether a defendant is 
prejudiced by joinder should be resolved in favor of severance. 
State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986). 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed: 
The trial court must, when defendants are 
charged jointly, weigh possible prejudice to 
any defendant with considerations of economy 
and practicalities of judicial administration. 
Doubts concerning prejudice should be resolved 
by the trial court in favor of a defendant, 
but the trial court must be afforded some 
discretion . . . A denial will be reversed by 
this Court only if a defendant's right to a 
fair trial has been impaired. 
Collins, 612 P.2d at 777. 
3Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure appears to 
have been replaced by Section 77-8a-l et seq. Subsection 4(a) 
corresponds with subsection (d) of Rule 9. 
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The Court further stated in O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 898: 
Notwithstanding [the] admonition [to resolve 
doubts concerning prejudice in favor of a 
defendant], trial courts often appear to be 
reluctant to grant severance in cases 
involving joint defendants. Such reluctance 
is ill-advised and in the long run risks 
greater expenditure of judicial resources. 
Thus, whenever joint defendants have defenses 
that appear to be inconsistent with or to 
obstruct or impede each other, the trial court 
should carefully examine requests for 
severance and should grant severance when 
there is any doubt as to prejudice. (Emphasis 
added)4 
The use of the word "appear" in O'Brien strongly suggests that 
trial courts need not conclude for a certainty that the defenses 
are antagonistic and irreconcilable--the mere appearance that the 
defenses are inconsistent or would obstruct or impede each other 
requires the trial court to grant severance when there is any doubt 
as to prejudice. 
Another court has stated: 
Severance should ordinarily be granted where 
defenses are so discrepant as to pose an 
evidentiary contest more between defendants 
themselves than between the state and the 
defendants. (Citation omitted). To be 
avoided is the spectacle where the state 
simply stands by and witnesses 'a combat in 
which the defendants [attempt] to destroy each 
other.' 
State v. Nelson, 260 S.E.2d 629, 640 (N.C. 1979) (citations 
omitted) (cited in O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 899 n. 4) . That is exactly 
what occurred in this case. The trial court erred in not severing 
the trials because the defenses were antagonistic and trying the 
4
 Counsel for the codefendant quoted the above passage to 
the trial court while arguing for severance in a hearing held on 
March 28, 1995. (R. at 518 line 14-25). 
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defendants together was prejudicial to the defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
A. THE DEFENDANTS1 DEFENSES WERE 
ANTAGONISTIC AND IRRECONCILABLE 
The defenses in this case were completely irreconcilable. 
Defendant Telford's defense was that he went to Willard Bay with 
the victim and codefendant, and that he witnessed the murder, but 
that it was the codefendant, Dahlquist, who actually committed the 
murder. It was the codefendant who received a telephone call 
informing him that the victim was a "rat" (R. at 1660 line 14-19; 
1685 line 23 to 1686 line 2), or a "federal informant" (R. at 1662 
line 13-15) or "informant" (R. at 1725 line 20-21) ; that there was 
a $10,000 hit out on the victim; and that the victim "was trying 
to set up a deal with [Dahlquist] to get him busted" (R. at 1663 
line 14-19; 1686 line 18 to 1687 line 5). It was the codefendant 
who shot the victim (R. at 1661 line 7-12; 1692 line 4-7; 1721 line 
24) . It was the codefendant who threatened to kill defendant 
Telford because he "spilled his guts and told everything he knew" 
about the murder (R. at 1687 line 13 to 1688 line 3). 
The codefendant' s defense was that he had an alibi (R. at 490 
line 25 to 491 line 1, 16-20; 492 line 17-25). The codefendant 
also informed the court that he intended to introduce evidence that 
defendant Telford had been seen with a gun just hours before the 
victim was murdered (R. at 491 line 1-4; 492 line 20-21), though 
no such evidence was ever produced. 
The trial court was presented with a sufficient amount of 
information to apprise it of the antagonistic nature of the 
defenses (though the word "antagonistic" may not have always been 
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used). At a hearing on September 19, 1994, the codefendant 
argued that "Mr. Telford has made 12 different statements to 
different individuals. . . . They are totally conflicting 
statements and every single one of them implicates my client to 
some degree or other." (R. at 263 line 1-2, 12-14). He also 
argued: 
My client is truly prejudiced by trying the two cases 
together. I mean, there is no way otherwise to say that 
he!s not being prejudiced. I think the case law out 
there is that it is in the discretion of the court . . 
. that if therefs any doubt that my client would be 
prejudiced by this you are supposed to wave [sic] it 
with judicial economy (R. at 264 line 7-15) . 
• * * 
What we1re arguing here is that if we don!t sever these 
my client will be severely prejudiced by statements that 
would not be used against him, could not be used against 
him. In the alternative, I canft cross-examine Mr. 
Telford. If they are put on the stand and these 
statements are read in, there 's nothing I can do to 
discredit those statements. They are statements that 
not only implicate my guy, but say he did it and I 
watched him do it and the statements were made in an 
attempt to exonerate the person who made them and 
implicate my guy (R. at 266 line 6-17) . 
Every single one of Mr. Telford1s statements, every 
single one of them, attempts to inculpate the defendant 
[Dahlquist] and exculpate the declarant [Telford]. . . 
. He says, I didn't pull the trigger, I didn't know 
anything about it. His whole entire defense is based 
upon the fact that he [Dahlquist] did it. 
(R. at 277 line 13-15, 21-24). 
5Counsel for defendant Telford did not explicitly join the 
motion to sever on September 19, 1994, nor did he argue on the 
motion. It was not apparent at that time that defendant's 
statements would be redacted and that his Sixth Amendment right 
to confront witnesses would be abrogated. 
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In a hearing on March 28, 1995, the codefendantfs counsel 
argued: 
. . . we still have two defendants, one of which is 
pointing the finger at Dahlquist. Mr. Dahlquist is 
saying I wasn't there. His whole defense is I wasn't 
there. I was set up by this man [Telford]. 
(R. at 514 line 17-20). Counsel indicated again that "we'll put 
a gun in Mr. Telford's hand two hours before the homicide." (R. 
at 520 line 2-4) . In O'Brien, the Court found that the defenses 
were not truly antagonistic, as both defendants admitted that the 
acts charged took place. In the instant case, only one defendant 
(Telford) admitted that the acts charged took place, while the 
codef endant (Dahlquist) denied being at the murder scene and denied 
any knowledge of the murder. The defenses were inconsistent and 
antagonistic. 
In the Utah cases of State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 
(Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978) and State v. 
Collins, 612 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980) , trials were held jointly and the 
appellate courts affirmed. However, in neither of those cases were 
the defenses antagonistic, and in neither case did a codefendant 
make an incriminating statement toward the other defendant. 
In United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1982), 
a case involving codefendants, one defendant moved to sever the 
trials. The trial court denied that motion, and the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that in that case there was no 
"such irreconcilability . . . as the jury could have concluded that 
both [defendants] believed the checks were legitimate." Jd. at 
671. In the instant case, there is no conceivable way the jury 
could have reconciled the two defenses--either Dahlquist was at the 
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murder scene (as defendant Telford claimed), or he wasn't (as 
codefendant Dahlquist claimed). The jury could not accept both 
positions. 
The case of People v. Sweet in, 156 NE 354 (111. 1927), is 
similar to the instant case. Sweetin was a homicide case in which 
the trial court was presented with evidence that the defendants1 
defenses were antagonistic to each other, that much of the evidence 
against the codefendant would be incompetent and prejudicial 
against the defendant, and that the codefendant had made many 
confessions and statements, both oral and written, in which he 
implicated the defendant in the crime. The Illinois Supreme Court 
held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
motion for severance. Although the trial court instructed the jury 
that the codefendant}s confessions were not admissible as against 
the defendant, the Supreme Court held that nevertheless such 
instruction could by no possibility eradicate the testimony from 
the minds of the jury, and that where one of several defendants 
jointly indicted made admissions or confessions implicating others, 
a severance should be ordered unless the prosecuting attorney 
declared that such admissions or confessions would not be offered 
in evidence at trial. 
In another Illinois case, People v. Rose, 180 NE 791 (111. 
1932) , in which two defendants were charged with murder, the trial 
court denied a motion to sever the trials. Like the instant case, 
the defense of one of the defendants was that he did not fire the 
fatal shot, it being fired by the other defendant, and the defense 
of the other defendant was that he was not present at the time and 
place of the shooting. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the 
26 
trial court committed reversible error in denying the motion to 
sever. The court stated that the defendants were put to the 
impossible task of presenting two inconsistent defenses to the same 
jury. 
Likewise, in Murray v. State, 528 P.2d 739 (Oklahoma 1974), 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the motions for severance, stating that the 
denial resulted in pitting the defendants against each other. 
In Stallard v. State, 215 SW2d 807 (Tenn. 1948), one defendant 
took the stand and testified that he had an alibi and couldn't have 
committed the murder, while his codefendant (who had made 
statements incriminating to the defendant) did not take the stand 
and could not therefore be cross-examined by the defendant. A 
cautionary instruction was given to the jury, but the Tennessee 
Supreme Court found that such an instruction was ineffectual and 
held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the 
motion to sever the trials. 
In the instant case, the two defendants1 defenses were 
unquestionably antagonistic, and the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to sever the trials. 
B. REFUSING TO SEVER THE TRIALS 
PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT 
In Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), a case in which two 
defendants were tried together for residential burglary, one 
defendant moved for severance of the trials, which the trial court 
denied. In its affirming decision, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
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that Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 9(b)6 
requires separate trials if it appears that the 
defendants will be prejudiced by joinder. Even if a 
trial court errs in denying a request for severance 
under rule 9, we will disregard the error unless it 
affects the substantial rights of the defendant. Utah 
R.Crim.P. 30(a). The substantial rights of a defendant 
are affected if we are persuaded that had the court 
granted a severance, an outcome more favorable to the 
defendant would have been reasonably likely." 
Id. at 190. (Emphasis original). 
Indeed, if the trial court in this case had granted severance, 
a more favorable outcome was reasonably likely, as the prosecuting 
attorney stated: 
What [the defendants] want is the best possible approach 
for them. That's advocacy, that's what it's all about. 
If they have separate trials it is better for them. 
They both have a better chance of walking out with no 
conviction if they're separated. 
(R. at 542 line 2-6) . That is precisely what the Utah Supreme 
Court has said requires severance. The prosecuting attorney made 
a further statement which indicated his belief that the defendants 
had a better chance of acquittal in separate trials: 
. . . it is unfair to the public, your Honor, if we're 
forced to separate these trials, because it is our 
allegation that they committed the crime together. We 
think we're entitled to put in all of the evidence 
against both of them . . . the rules of evidence, if 
they're separated, somehow or other may end up 
prohibiting crucial evidence if we try them separately. 
That's been my concern all along. 
(R. at 511 line 23 to 512 line 6). The implication is that the 
"crucial" evidence the prosecutor was afraid wouldn't be presented 
to the jury was evidence that would tend to lead toward conviction, 
not acquittal. 
6See Footnote 3. 
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The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Boykin, 307 N.C. 
87, 296 S.E.2d 258 (1982), and State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 
S.E.2d 222 (1976), concluded in each case that joinder of trials 
against two defendants prevented one of the defendants from 
offering exculpatory evidence which would have been available had 
the cases not been joined. 
Similarly, in the instant case defendant Telford was prevented 
from offering exculpatory evidence through cross-examination of 
Detective Hansen concerning the redacted statement. The problem 
of not being allowed to fairly cross-examine Detective Hansen would 
not have existed in a separate trial. If the cases had been tried 
separately, defendant Telford would have been able to introduce 
evidence, through his statement to the detective, that would tend 
to exculpate him (i.e., that defendant Dahlquist murdered the 
victim and that defendant Telford was only a witness at best, a 
coerced participant at worst). (See argument contained in Point 
III) . 
Counsel for defendant Telford argued to the trial court about 
the defendant's rights which would be prejudiced: 
Our position is that Travis Telford has a 
substantial right, a very substantial right, to not 
incriminate himself, to not testify. If these redacted 
statements are brought in he effectively loses that 
right. HeTll have to get up and testify about the gaps, 
because these statements will say I picked him up, but 
there will be some distance in between that hefs going 
to have to explain.7 
7The prosecutor agreed: 
So Mr. Bouwhuis, I submit, is correct in his assertion 
that if that all happens he'll have to put Mr. Telford 
on the stand to explain it. 
(R. at 541 line 22-24) . 
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• * * 
So my argument is that there are two substantial 
rights. One is his right to testify or not. The other 
is that we believe the jury may, if Mr. Dahlquist 
testifies and he!s allowed to bring his alibi defense 
in, that may be a big nail in Mr. Telford1 s coffin, 
because his entire defense is that Mr. Dahlquist is the 
one who was there and had the gun and pulled the 
trigger. If the jury believes that he was not there, 
then he!s given some conflicting statements that, I 
think, is the nail in his coffin, because if they 
believe Mr. Dahlquist wasn't there, then Travis is lying 
about the whole thing. All we know is that he was there 
and all the evidence will be that he and Troy Weston an 
some unknown person were there. 
So if this is not severed and Mr. Dahlquist gets 
his alibi defense in, I think there's a reasonable 
likelihood that Travis could be convicted of murder. If 
they're severed, Mr. Dahlquist doesn't have his alibi 
defense in and it will be easier for him to -- for us to 
convince the jury that it was Mr. Dahlquist that did it, 
therefore bringing about a reasonable likelihood that he 
may not be convicted of murder. 
Our position is that we're asking the court to 
exercise its discretion and grant a severance because of 
the two rights of Mr. Telford that will be affected. 
His Fifth Amendment right to not testify and the 
prejudice that would occur if they are tried together. 
(R. at 530 line 11-18, 25 to 532 line 4) . 
It's obvious the State's attorney was not concerned with the 
possible prejudice to the defendants by holding joint trials, as 
he stated to the trial court, "[t]he practical effect on the jury 
of [nonseverance] is the defendant's problem. We accomplish the 
goal of moving things along through the judicial system ..." (R. 
at 527 line 10-12). The prosecuting attorney pushed the advantage 
of a joint trial even further when he brazenly displayed to the 
jury a cardboard box with the name "Telquist" written in bold 
letters on its side (a word which combines the names "Telford" and 
"Dahlquist") (R. at 775 line 20 to 777 line 16). The joinder of 
the codefendants' names created the suggestion to the jury that, 
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while there may have been two separate defendants, for the purposes 
of this trial they were one person, thus making it easier for the 
jury to render the same verdict for each defendant. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
AND HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
WERE VIOLATED BY THE ADMISSION OF THE 
REDACTED STATEMENT AND THE RESTRICTED 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE HANSEN 
The trial court attempted to avoid prejudice to defendant 
Dahlquist by redacting defendant Telford!s statement to Detective 
Hansen. While the redaction may have mitigated the prejudice to 
defendant Dahlquist, the very process violated the constitutional 
rights of defendant Telford. There may be circumstances in which 
redacting a codefendant's statements satisfies the interests of 
justice without requiring a severance of trials. Because of the 
competing constitutional rights in this case, however, redaction 
was not the answer. Counsel for defendant Telford argued to the 
trial court: 
The two defendants have competing constitutional rights. 
I think the court has tried to balance that, but under 
the circumstances their constitutional rights can't be 
balanced. One of them gets them and the other one 
doesn't. The court has made a ruling that Mr. Dahlquist 
have his constitutional right to confrontation through 
redacting statements. Mr. Telford's right to 
confrontation, under the Sixth Amendment, is lost in the 
process and, in addition to that, Mr. Telford has the 
right against self-incrimination. 
(R. at 778 line 7-17) . An attempt was made to ascertain, prior to 
opening statements, exactly how the statements would read as 
redacted. The trial court said: 
. . . I think, because of the time constraints, on the 
redaction issue we'll reserve that and perhaps address 
that in the morning before the jury is here. The 
difficulty is if we address all of these issues we may 
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have a jury brought in near five and excused for the day 
and that was not the instructions they were given or the 
expectation. 
(R. at 778 line 23 to 779 line 5). Defense counsel countered: 
I understand the court's frustration with the way this 
trial is going. The problem is that the severance, the 
redactions and their constitutional rights all tie 
together and go to the issue of severance. . . . I 
don't have a problem with addressing the redaction 
tomorrow morning. The problem is that we are scheduled 
to give opening statements this afternoon. How that 
issue is decided on redaction may very well decide what 
comes in under the opening statements. 
(R. at 779 line 6-17). Further: 
Again, I understand the court's frustration and 
this is taking longer than normal, but I also want to 
stress to the court and everybody here that, with all 
due respect to the jury, if they've got to wait another 
20 minutes to ensure that these defendants' 
constitutional rights are protected, that's America. 
What I'm urging on the court is that we first look out 
for the defendants' constitutional rights. 
(R. at 780 line 18 to 781 line 1). The trial court, however, 
refused to deal with the issue before opening statements (R. at 781 
line 14-16). This is another illustration of the trial court's 
lack of interest in protecting the defendant's constitutional 
rights. It is also another illustration of the prejudicial effect 
on the defendant of holding joint trials. 
The prosecuting attorney described for the trial court the 
process by which the defendant's statements would be redacted: 
Those can all be redacted to eliminate any 
reference to Mr. Dahlquist. For example, I have gone 
through them and drawn lines through them. . . . For 
example, here's just the first sentence of one that I've 
redacted. Telford says, "Up until the point where we 
got mad at him" referring to he and Brandon Dahlquist. 
That can be redact [sic] to say up to the point where I 
got mad at him; or you can simply leave it out and say 
up to the point where got mad at him. Some of the 
pronouns will need to be removed. 
3_2 
Another example, Travis says, "Saturday morning I 
went there," referring to picking up the victim. Dale 
Ward says okay. Then Travis says, "with Brandon to pick 
him up. It!s not that difficult to do. 
(R. at 525 line 3-21). For some reason, the unredacted portions 
of defendant's statement to Detective Hansen never found their way 
into the record in toto. However, there are several comments in 
the record which give clues as to how the unredacted statement 
originally read: 
THE COURT: . . . I obviously do not have copies of any 
transcripts or statements at all from Mr. Telford. You 
tell me specifically is there anything approaching a 
confession or approaching an accusation that says the 
co-defendant did it? 
MR. SNIDER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Give me some specifics. 
MR. BUNDERSON: That's going to be difficult to summarize in 
less than a couple of hours, Your Honor. 
MR. SNIDER: That's the problem. I figure we have 14 
statements that this defendant has made. The first one 
goes from I wasn't there, but I think Brandon did it, 
all the way to that Brandon pulled the trigger and 
pointed the gun at me and made me drag the body. He 
pointed the gun at me and made me load it again so we 
could pump more bullets into the body. That's what the 
statements are. That is clearly a situation where we 
have a co-defendant pointing the finger at Mr. Dahlquist 
and saying he did it, he made me do it, and Mr. 
Dahlquistfs only defense is that I was not there (R. at 
515 line 13 to 516 line 8). 
• • • 
. . . It is clear Mr. Telford is saying you made me do 
it and you pointed a gun at me. That's what Mr. 
Telford's defense will be (R. at 517 line 12-15). 
* * * 
Mr. Telford's statements are not inculpatory in any way, 
shape or form. His statements are clearly I didn't do 
it; he did (R. at 518 line 3-6) . 
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When the redacted statement, as testified to by Detective 
Hansen, is reviewed in light of the foregoing portions of the 
record, it is easy to see how it probably read in its unredacted 
form. The following is the statement, with reasonably inferred 
additions and changes: 
On April 14, 1994, while en route to Box Elder 
County Jail with prisoner Travis Telford, he told me 
about the day of the homicide of Troy Weston. 
• • * 
About 4:15 while on I-15 en route to the jail, 
Travis, without being asked, started to talk about the 
homicide of Troy Weston. He said that Troy had inquired 
about buying a gun because he had some people who wanted 
to hurt him. He said he and Dahlquist went and picked 
up Troy Weston at his house and headed out to Willard to 
show him the gun. 
He said that when he and Dahlquist and Troy arrived 
out in Willard, Dahlquist pulled out a small automatic 
.22 caliber handgun. He said that they had parked on 
the side of the road to shoot. They then got out and 
went over to shoot the gun and Troy asked how did it 
work. Travis said that when Troy asked if it worked, he 
was shot by Dahlquist in the shoulder. He said Troy 
screamed and said what are you doing. Dahlquist then 
shot Troy again. This time twice in the back, because 
Troyfs body had then shifted sideways. 
He then said Troy continued to yell to stop it. He 
then said that one of the bullets must have hit Troyfs 
spine because he quit moving and just dropped to the 
ground. Dahlquist then shot Troy again twice more in 
the front and the gun jammed. He said it either jammed 
or ran out of ammunition. Dahlquist pointed the gun at 
Travis and ordered him to go back to the Blazer and get 
another clip. When he got back to the Blazer Dahlquist 
loaded the new clip and placed the gun under Troyfs chin 
and pulled the trigger one last time. He then said Troy 
did not move anymore and Dahlquist ordered Telford to 
drag the body about 30 feet to the ditch. Telford and 
Dahlquist then got back to the Blazer and sped back to 
Ogden. 
The court was informed that defendant Telford intended to rely 
on his unredacted statement to present his defense to the jury. 
. . . I know that Mr. Telford has taken the position 
that he!s not going to testify. He!s made statements to 
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the police officers. His credibility will be placed on 
those statements (R. at 521 line 1-4). 
We believe, through those statements, we'll be able to 
get out what we want in order to establish his defense. 
Our intention at this time, . . . is that he won't 
testify. We feel like we can get what we need out of 
the statements (R. at 528 line 22 to 529 line 4). 
Mr. Telford wants to put on the defense that he can put 
on without having to testify. Mr. Bunderson will offer 
the statements. Mr. Telford has a Fifth Amendment right 
in that regard. He can testify through the statements, 
but to testify through those statements he's got to 
inculpate my client and we can't cross-examine him on 
those (R. at 535 line 17-24) . 
Redacting the statements, however, presented a problem for the 
defendant, as illustrated by the prosecutor's comments: 
It creates a practical problem for the defense, as Mr. 
Snider has pointed out, because the jury sits there in 
a joint trial and hears all sorts of evidence about both 
of them. The only thing they don't hear is that in Mr. 
Telford's confessions is a reference to Brandon 
Dahlquist. You simply hear references to himself doing 
various things, such as picking up the victim, driving 
with him in a Blazer and so on.8 
(R. at 526 line 7-15) . Counsel for defendant Telford argued: 
[T]he discussion here has been about the rights to Mr. 
Dahlquist if the statements are redacted of references 
made to him. I want to point out that this also affects 
Mr. Telford. The way it affects him, if his statements 
are redacted and brought in at trial, then we have the 
problem of these large gaps. This in effect forces 
Travis Telford to testify against his will. We don't 
intend to testify if we can get in through his 
statements what we feel we can, what we need. Then he 
doesn't have to testify and subject himself to cross-
examination. He has a Fifth Amendment right not to 
8
 Interestingly, the prosecutor continued by stating: "But 
that's a risk one takes when one engages in criminal activity. 
That's the risk that is inherent in being tried. It may be, 
frankly, criticized as somewhat cynical, but that's the way it's 
done." (R. at 526 line 16-20). One can't help but ask, 
"Whatever happened to the presumption of innocence?" 
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testify. However, if these redacted statements come in, 
he111 have no choice but to explain the gaps. 
(R. at 529 line 5-18) . The prosecutor agreed: 
So Mr. Bouwhuis, I submit, is correct in his assertion 
that if that all happens he'll have to put Mr. Telford 
on the stand to explain it. 
(R. at 541 line 22-24) .9 
The defendant objected to the admission of the redacted 
statement, and requested to be allowed to ask Detective Hansen on 
cross-examination if the statement is a complete representation of 
what the defendant had told him. The court disallowed that 
question and effectively restricted the defendant from engaging in 
any meaningful cross-examination (R. at 1390 line 2 to 1397 line 
25). Counsel for the defendant argued: 
I don't see how the court can limit me as counsel for 
Travis Telford on cross-examination, to say that I 
cannot question these witnesses on issues that go to the 
very heart of his defense. That denies him the right to 
a fair trial and I think that's clearly an appealable 
issue. 
(R. at 545 line 16-22). 
It has long been established that fl[o]ne of the fundamental 
guaranties of life and liberty is found in the Sixth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States, which provides that 'in all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall . . . be confronted with 
9It is noteworthy that Utah Rule of Evidence 106 has some 
bearing on this issue. It reads: 
When a writing or recorded statement or a part thereof 
is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require 
him at that time to introduce any other part or any 
other writing or recorded statement which ought in 
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
This rule was brought to the trial court's attention. (R. at 533 
line 17 to 535 line 12). 
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the witnesses against him.'" Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 890 
(1898). Furthermore, the confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, which was extended against the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to cross-
examine witnesses against him. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 
94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); Green v. McElroy. 
360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). 
Courts have found that if a defendant's right to cross-examine 
a witness is restricted by competing constitutional rights, the 
direct testimony of that particular witness shouldn't be allowed 
in the first place. If a defendant's cross-examination is 
restricted by the competing Fifth Amendment right of a witness, it 
may be necessary to strike the direct testimony of that witness. 
See e.g. . United States v. Frank. 520 F.2d 1287, 1292 (2d Cir. 
1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 878, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 
(1976) ; United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1974) . 
Another court has stated that if the invocation of certain 
rights 
precludes inquiry into the details of his direct 
testimony, there may be a substantial danger of 
prejudice because the defense is deprived of the right 
to test the truth of his direct testimony and, 
therefore, that witness's testimony should be stricken 
in whole or in part. 
Dunbar v. Harris, 612 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1979) . In the instant 
case defendant Dahlquist had a right to confront the witnesses 
against him, and obviously could not do that if the person making 
the statement (defendant Telford) did not take the stand. 
Defendant Dahlquist asserted that right and the court protected 
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that right by redacting the statement. In the process, however, 
the court restricted defendant Telford's right to cross-examine 
Detective Hansen and inquire into the details of the statement he 
read (and thereby test the truth of it) . This was also pointed out 
to the trial court by the prosecutor: 
Mr. Dahlquist has a right to have those statements 
redacted and has the right to not have co-defendant's 
counsel raising that issue, unless, when he gets to his 
case in chief, Mr. Telford's counsel puts on Mr. 
Telford. Once he puts on Mr. Telford then it's all out 
the window. 
(R. at 541 line 14-19). 
While the trial court felt it could resolve the 
irreconcilability of the defenses by redacting defendant Telford's 
statement and restricting his right to cross-examine, the only way 
to truly resolve the problem was to sever the trials. The court 
did not do that. The way the court chose to resolve the problem 
violated defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and 
prejudiced him thereby. 
The prosecuting attorney argued to the trial court that 
[o]ur criminal law focuses upon fairness to the 
defendants, but it is not entirely a one-way street. It 
focuses more precisely upon a defendant's rights. . . . 
On the other hand, the people have rights too. The 
people have a right to judicial economy. The court has 
to balance those rights. Very often the balance will 
fall in favor of the defendant, but in this particular 
instance the court has charted a course that would allow 
us to worship at the altar of judicial economy . . . . 
(R. at 542 line 23-25; 543 line 4-10) . Defendants have a 
constitutional right to a fair trial. It would be interesting 
indeed to learn where in the Constitution we may find the people's 
right to judicial economy, and furthermore, why this "right" should 
3£ 
carry more weight than a defendant's constitutional right to a fair 
trial and due process. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found that when a trial courtT s 
error amounts to a violation of a defendant's right of 
confrontation, reversal is required unless the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Villarreal, 889 P. 2d 419 (Utah 
1995) . There was a reasonable likelihood that, had the trials been 
held separately, defendant Telford would have been acquitted of the 
charge. The error in this case was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Conclusion 
The trial court erred by not suppressing the letters written 
by the defendant while incarcerated and confiscated by jail 
personnel. More importantly, the court erred by refusing to sever 
the trials of the defendants. Their defenses were irreconcilably 
antagonistic and it was prejudicial to try the defendants jointly. 
The trial court also erred by admitting the redacted statement 
testified to by Detective Hansen, and by limiting cross-examination 
concerning the statement. This Court should reverse the conviction 
and remand this case for a new trial, separate from the 
codefendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^> day of November 1996. 
^"^VIICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS / 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Mr. Telford has made 12 different 
statements to different individuals. I would like to 
ask the court how they can have 12 totally different 
statements, and not only are they different, but 
conflicting statements., and they're going to try and 
prove that they're, quote, guaranteed trustworthy, 
under Rule 804. They can't. They cannot use the 
statements at all. So by trying my client with Mr. 
Telford. Mr. Bunderson is kind of like sneaking them 
in. I cannot call Mr. Telford to cross-examine him. 
I can't — there is no way that I can confront those 
statements. They are totally conflicting statements 
and every single one of them implicates my client t; 
some degrrr - r other. 
The state has no evidence to put my client 
at the cri^t scene but for these statements. That's 
all they've got. I'm afraid that if we try these two 
cases together the jury will take Mr. Dahlquist and 
implicate him in a crime simply by guilt by 
associati on. 
The court, in regards to severing the two 
trials, needs to take into consideration if it appears 
that — I'm quoting from 77-35-9 of the Utah Code., 
subsection C . "if it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or 
defendants in an indictment or information, or by a 
joinder for trial together., the court shall order an 
election of separate trials of separate counts, or 
grant a severance of defendants., or provide such other 
relief as justice requires." There's no ifs. ands or 
buts there. 
My client is truly prejudiced by trying 
the two cases together. I mean, there is no way 
otherwise to say that he's not being prejudiced. I 
think the case law out there is that it is in the 
discretion of the court, and Mr. Bunderson pointed out 
that it is in the discretion of the court, that if 
there's any doubt that my client would be prejudiced 
by this you are supposed to wave it with judicial 
economy. The cost of an appeal and the time involved 
there is much greater than the severing of these two 
defendants for trial and letting Mr. Dahlquist proceed 
with his case on its merits by itself. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you, again, though, 
counsel. I understand the issues with regards to the 
rules of evidence. I'm having a hard time walking 
through what I see as perhaps a philosophical dilemma. 
That being, if I were to proceed as you propose and 
direct that Mr. Telford's trial go first and then your 
client, wouldn't Mr. Bouwhuis be fullv entitled to at 
regards to — T can't remember the name of the case. 
MR. BUNDER SON: State vs. Cabatutan. 
MR. SNIDER: Yes. -But that's not what is 
happening here. This is not a situation where my 
client would be unavailable to testify in behalf of 
Mr. Telford. What we're arguing here is that if we 
don't sever these my client will be severely 
prejudiced by st. cements that would not be used 
against him., could not be used against him. 
In the alternative, I can't cross-examine 
Mr. Telford. If they are put on the stand and these 
statements are read in. there's nothing I can do to 
discredit those statements. They are statements that 
not only implicate my guy. but say he did it and I 
watched him do it and the statements were made in an 
attempt to exonerate the person who made them and 
implicate my guy. 
Under State vs. Collins. Your Honor, and 
I've cited it in my brief, 612 P.2nd 275, I quote: 
"The trial court must, when defendants are charged 
jointly, weigh possible prejudice to any defendant 
with considerations of economy and practicalities of 
judicial administration. Doubts concerning prejudice 
should be resolved by the trial court in favor of a 
defendant." 
statements which the person made was a statement 
against interest. 
In the Drawn case it was a co-defendant 
who was a driver of a car involved in an armed 
robbery. Shortly after the robbery a good friend of 
mine, police officer Corey Nuble, pulls over two black 
females who turn around and confess that they were the 
drivers of the car, the car in the armed robbery. 
That was a statement against interest. It in no way, 
shape or form attempted to inculpate the defendant and 
exculpate the declarant, because if that were the case 
it would, quote., lack trustworthiness. 
Every single one of Mr. Telford's 
statements, every single one of them, attempts to 
inculpate the defendant and exculpate the declarant. 
What Mr. Telford has done the entire time he's been 
incarcerated is exactly what he told his sister 
before. He said, I'm not worried about going down on 
this case. I'm going to have Brandon take the fall. 
Every single one of his statements attempts to 
minimize what he was involved in. He says, I didn't 
pull the trigger, I didn't know anything about it. 
His whole entire defense is based upon the fact that 
he did it. 
This is not a typical case. It's not a he 
1, person in the declarant's position would not have madi 
K ! 
2; the statement unless believing it to be true." 
3 -I For those reasons, I'll deny the motion to 
4 ! sever. I do tend to agree with the prosecution's 
position. It seems to the court that a cautionary 
instruction in a joint trial provides more cover, so 
to speak, for Mr. Dahlquist, than if the trials are 
separated., because in that case, in the court's view 
of that rule, it would be entirely inappropriate to 
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reason I'm going to direct the trials to proceed next 
Monday ^crning. 
Let's go to the other motion, which is the 
motion * c ^u;j~rrss. 
MR. ^"TTE*: What we're looking at here is a 
statement. ^ r. d this is — the reason I want to exclude 
the statement from the defendant in the copy of the 
interview between the police officers and Mr. 
Dahlquist. is that the police officer sits down and 
says we're at the Box Elder County sheriff's office. 
This is Brandon Dahlquist. Is that correct? Yes. 
What is your date of birth and he asks for Brandon's 
Social Security number. 
The first question out of the 
investigator's mouth in regards to any kind of 
1 I preliminary hearing., stated that she had death threats 
2 I prior to her testimony and death threats after her 
testimony. She had death threats as soon as she was 
off the stand and walked out the door. 
5 | I've had two witnesses that I've attempted 
6 | to subpoena. One is Mark Spens. Mark Spens is 
7 1 essential to our case. It's funny that the State knew 
8 I about Mark Spens several months ago. but I've had no 
9 I interviews with Mr. Spens at all. I originally 
10 I subpoenaed him for the first hearing and he said he 
11 would be here. I continued it to the second date and 
12 we subpoenaed him and he indicated that he would be 
13 here. However, he did not appear on the second 
14 hearing and I did not ask the court at that time for a 
15 bench warrant because I did not want to jeopardize my 
16 relationship with Mr. Spens. 
17 When I attempted to contact Mr. Spens 
18 after the second continuance I learned from his 
19 parents that he's on the streets and is running 
20 scared. Mr. Spens was subpoenaed the first time. He 
21 did not appear. I got a warrant issued for him. I 
22 prepared a second summons for him. I gave it to the 
23 sheriff's office in Morgan. I also gave one in Weber 
24 Countv. Thev cannot find him. 
25 He's essential. He's a primary witness 
that establishes my client's alibi. He's the primary 
witness that can put a gun in Mr. Telford's hand a few 
hours, about two hours, prior to -- before the 
homicide. He is an essential witness to this case. I 
cannot get him here. For that reason, I need to have 
this continued so I can get time to have Mr. Spens 
here. Normally I would say. well, we have his 
testimony from the preliminary hearing, but we don't. 
I know that Mr. Spens is in the area. I 
had an a ppointment with him the other day to meet him 
at Dees in Ogden. I heard through an informant that 
he's scared, is afraid for his life, and refused to 
meet with me. have an investiaator that has been 
looking for him. We can't find him. I believe if 
this matter were continued I could find Mr. Spens. 
A second person is Tressia Gohn. She's 
essential to establish Mr. Dahlquist's alibi also. 
Ms. Gohn made statements to the police officers 
shortly after the homicide which gave Mr. Dahlquist a 
clear and convincing alibi. She puts him with her the 
morning of the homicide. Without her, I do not have 
that alibi. I need her and she's essential and we 
can't find her. In fact, the last time I had my 
investigator serve her he had to track her down 






















her mother had informed on how to find her, she came 
back and threatened her mother. 
She's clearly indicated to my investigator 
that she'll not appear. She refused to accept the 
subpoena last time and didn't come. I didn't 
initially ask for a bench warrant in her situation 
because I knew where she was living. I've since 
learned, I think Thursday or Friday of last week, that 
the subpoena came back. In fact, it hasn't come back 
to my office. The sheriff still has it. They called 
my office and said we can't find her. We checked all 
of our sources and they don't know where she is. 
These two people are essential. Without 
them Mr. Dahlquist doesn't have a case. I have some 
other peripheral witnesses, but those two are the 
primary establishment of his alibi defense. 
MR. BUNDERSON: I missed what Tressia Gohn's 
testimony would be for. 
MR. SNIDER: She establishes an alibi for Mr. 
Dahlquist. Mark Spens puts a gun in Mr. Telford's 
hand 
MR. BUNDERSON: You said Tressia Gohn puts 
somebody somewhere. 
MR. SNIDER: She puts Mr. Dahlquist with her the 
morning of the homicide, during that period of time. 
captain in the U.S. Air Force. He's leaving in June. 
We don't know for sure which day in June so we'll have 
to assume June 1st. He's being transferred to Edwards 
4 | Air Force Base in California. It's not impossible to 
5 | get him back, but it does increase the difficulty of 
6 I having him available. He is currently stationed at 
7 | Hill Air Force Base. I don't know if he's taking 
8 | furlough or leave during some interim there also. 
9 I MR. BOUWHUTS: If I may be heard briefly, I'm 
10 sure the court has taken into consideration Mr. 
11 Telford's position, but for the record I did make a 
12 motion at the last trial setting for a continuance 
13 because we had a problem with the witnesses. We are 
14 ready to go now. Mr. Telford has been in jail for a 
15 year. We're ready to proceed Monday. 
16 I understand their position about the 
17 continuance. I think this obviously spills over to 
18 the issue of severance. So the court is aware, our 
19 position is that we're ready to go Monday. We've been 
20 ready for some time. He's not sitting in jail or 
21 prison on any other charge. He's waiting for this to 
22 be resolved. Our y-sition is let's go. 
23 MR. BUNDERSON: I would just like to add that it 
24 is unfair to the public, Your Honor, if we're forced 
25 to separate these trials, because it is our allegation 
that they committed the crime together. We think 
2 | we're entitled to put in all of the evidence against 
3 1 both of them. The rules of evidence, if they're 
separated, somehow or other may end up prohibiting 
crucial evidence if we try them separately. That's 
been my concern all along. 
THE COURT: I'm going to take a recess for a few 
minutes. I want to review the file. Obviously this 
motion affects where we go as far as the other 
motions. I'm going to review that for a few minutes 
before we proceed. Court will be in recess. 
THE BAILIFF: Court will be in recess. 
( Short recess. ) 
THE COURT: Counsel, I've considered the matter. 
I think counsel have very capably pointed out the 
difficulties with the issue and the motion. 
Probably the single most important 
ingredient for a judge is to be fair. I recognize 
that there's a considerable fairness argument here. 
But fairness applies across the board. I think I may 
have been presented what is essentially a Hobson's 
choice here, because the continuance creates its own 
set of problems and appealable issues. 
After considering the matter, I'm denying 
the motion. The trial will go forward next Monday 
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1 justice, which is not what he's being tried for. Even 
2 if we were to redact everything that is in regards to 
3 Brandon, Your Honor, this is not a Richardson vs. 
4 Marsh type situation. Richardson is very clearly a 
5 situation where they had three co-defendants. One of 
6 them was not being tried and was not present at the 
7 trial. If there's reference in the redacted 
8 statements about "I didn't do it, one of the other 
9 defendants did it," that made sense in Richardson. It 
10 does not make any sense here. 
11 If we were to take Brandon's name and 
12 every reference to him and every statement that Mr. 
13 Telford has made, it would take a juror with only half 
14 a brain to figure out, well, there's two defendants 
15 sitting at the table. If he didn't do it who did? 
16 Even if we were to redact out everything, 
17 w still have two defendants, one of which is pointing 
18 the finger at Mr. Dahlquist. Mr. Dahlquist is saying 
19 I wasn't there. His whole defense is I wasn't there. 
20 I was setup by this man. How is the court going to 
21 justify redacting out the statements from this man 
22 that infers guilt on my client and point it to 
23 somebody else? There's no way we can. The only 
24 situation that a reasonable jury could look at is that 
25 Mr. Dahlauist is a co-defendant. He must be the other 
1 I person that Mr. Telford says was there. 
2 | An important issue, if you look in Marsh, 
3 I Your Honor, and I don't know if the court has had an 
4 opportunity to review that or not. 
5 MR- BUNDERSON: I have a copy, Your Honor. 
6 MR. SNIDER: I also have a copy. 
7 MR. BUNDERSON: If I may approach the bench, the 
8 defense presented Bruton vs. United States. We 
9 presented Richardson vs. Marsh. There's also State 
10 vs. Nield, a Utah case. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Snider, I'll review those, but 
12 let me ask you to give me some specifics. I reviewed 
13 your motion. I obviously do not have copies of any 
14 transcripts or statements at all from Mr. Telford. 
15 You tell me specifically is there anything approaching 
16 a confession or approaching an accusation that says 
17 the co-defendant did it? 
18 MR. SNIDER: Yes . 
19 THE COURT: Give me some specifics. 
20 MR. BUNDERSON: That's going to be difficult to 
21 summarize in less than a couple of hours, Your Honor. 
22 MR. SNIDER: That's the problem. I figure we 
23 have 14 statements that this defendant has made. The 
24 first one goes from I wasn't there, but I think 
25 Brandon did it, all the way to that Brandon pulled the 
1 I trigger and pointed the gun at me and made me drag the 
2 | body. He pointed the gun at me and made me load it 
3 I again so we could pump more bullets into the body. 
4 That's what the statements are. That is clearly a 
5 situation where we have a co-defendant pointing the 
6 finger at Mr. Dahlquist and saying he did it, he made 
7 me do it, and Mr. Dahlquist's only defense is that I 
8 was not there. 
9 If you were to take out the "he" part of 
10 it, it's quite obvious that the jury cannot exclude 
11 that. This is not a situation like Richardson where 
12 they have a third or fourth co-defendant. Every case 
13 that the State cites deals with multiple 
14 co-defendants, more than two. One has three, one has 
15 five. 
16 In researching this, I've talked it over 
17 defense counsel and I went and contacted some 
18 professors in California from my old law school. I 
19 talked with the dean at the University of Utah 
20 regarding this particular issue. Every single one of 
21 them says no, this is a Bruton situation, clear cut. 
22 The Supreme Court has decided on this case. 
23 Your Honor, in regards to Marsh, or 
24 Richardson vs. Marsh, there are three things that you 
25 have to look at. One is are there circumstances which 
1 allow the confession to stand even noting the Sixth 
2 Amendment -- my client's Sixth Amendment right. In 
3 Richardson there were three defendants, one of which 
4 was not present at the time of the trial. We've 
5 already talked about that. The defendant made his 
6 confession and he talked mainly about a co-defendant 
7 who was not present and was not tried. That's the 
8 reason why in Richardson they allowed the statements 
9 to come in against the one defendant who had made the 
10 statements because they did not directly implicate th 
11 co-defendant being tried at the same time. 
12 This is not that situation at all. It is 
13 clear Mr. Telford is saying you made me do it and you 
14 pointed a gun at me. That's what Mr. Telford's 
15 defense will be. 
16 The crime that they committed in 
17 Richardson, Your Honor, could be explained without 
18 involving the co-defendant. In other words, in Marsh 
19 it involved a crime where the facts — the one 
20 co-defendant could have committed the crime by himsel 
21 or jointly acting with another individual, without 
22 implicating the co-defendant who was being tried 
23 jointly. In this situation you can't. 
24 They went on in Richardson and said that 
25 because of the confession, defendant's admission that 




















inculpatory and therefore it was essential that the 
statements could be used against him. Mr. Telford's 
statements are not inculpatory in any way, shape or 
form. His statements are clearly I didn't do it; he 
did. 
That goes to the issue of Bruton and right 
back to a situation that I'm now quoting from Collins; 
which cites Bruton. "The trial court must, when 
defendants are charged jointly, weigh possible 
prejudice to any defendant with considerations of 
economy and practicalities of judicial administration. 
Doubts :::,Ccrning prejudice should be resolved by the 
trial ec~it ir. favor of the defendant. Notwithstar. dir. 5 
that adr^r.itic:. , trial courts," and this is the 
Supreme Court cf Utah speaking here, "trial courts 
often appe a r be reluctant to arant severance in 
cases involving joint defendants. Such reluctance is 
ill-advis^d and in the long run risks greater 
expenditure of judicial resources. Whenever joint 
defendants have defenses that appear to be 
inconsistent with or obstruct or impede each other, 
the trial court should carefully consider requests for 
severance and should grant severance when there is, 
25 quote, any doubt as to prejudice." That's the Supreme 
1 entire defense is I've been setup by that man. I 
2 didn't do it and I can prove I didn't do it and we'll 
3 put a gun in Mr. Telford's hand two hours before the 
4 homicide. We'll have death threats coming from this 
5 man. That's the only defense we have. 
6 It is clearly a situation where one client 
7 is not implicating himself and implicating a 
8 co-defendant. We have a defendant who is implicating 
9 a man who has an alibi and that is exactly right on 
10 point with Bruton. 
11 There must be redaction of Brandon's 
12 statements and any reference to Brandon's existence. 
13 In looking at that, and I haven't seen the redacted 
14 statements, but in looking at the statement and any 
15 reference to this man in regards to any implication he 
16 may have had to the crime, it takes out 99 percent of 
17 Mr. Telford's statements all together. 
18 Unfortunately/ if we try these cases 
19 together, Mr. Bunderson may not be able to prove the 
20 case against my guy because he has to redact 
21 everything. If he redacts everything involving my 
22 client, he'll have to redact almost everything that 
23 Mr. Telford said. That puts the State in a situation 
24 where they may not have any type of a conviction at 
25 all. It puts us in a situation where both defendants 
are having to testify or not testify. I know that Mr. 
Telford has taken the position that he's not going to 
testify. He's made statements to the police officers. 
His credibility will be placed on those statements. I 
cannot in any way, shape or form, and I don't know how 
Mr. Bunderson will argue this, cross-examine a 
statement that Mr. Telford has made. I can't under 
804. We have to go back to the issue of how reliable 
those statements are. 
In summing up, Your Honor, Miller vs. 
Miller is a case that is very important. I've 
prepared that one for the court. In that situation 
the court, the trial court, allowed statements made by 
a co-defendant — 
MR. BUNDERSON: What's the citation? 
MR. SNIDER: 784 Federal Supp., 390. It's a 
Michigan case, a 1992 Michigan case. They're citing 
Lee vs. Illinois in that case. In the case of Miller 
vs. Miller, Your Honor, under the Michigan rules of 
evidence, which is exactly the same as ours, in effect 
they site 804(b) , which Mr. Bunderson jumped up and 
down on the last time we filed this motion to sever, 
and the Court of Appeals in that case said that under 
804(b) (3) , statements made by two co-defendants 
against all the others were admissible, but in a 
1 The other is actually two letters to Nicole McCord. I 
2 think it's appropriate that both of those come in. 
3 Those can all be redacted to eliminate any 
4 reference to Mr. Dahlquist. For example, I have gone 
5 through them and drawn lines through them. They're on 
6 a word processor. Hopefully by this afternoon, if the 
7 sheriff's office typist is available, and I believe 
8 she is, we can have them redacted. 
9 For example, here's just the first 
10 sentence of one that I've redacted. Telford says, "up 
11 until the point where we got mad at him," referring to 
12 he and Brandon Dahlquist. That can be redact to say 
13 up to the point where I got mad at him; or you can 
14 simply leave it out and say up to the point where got 
15 mad at him. Some of the pronouns will need to be 
16 removed. 
17 Another example, Travis says, "Saturday 
18 morning I went there," referring to picking up the 
19 victim. Dale Ward says okay. Then Travis says, "with 
20 Brandon to pick him up." That can be redacted to read 
21 to pick him up. It's not that difficult to do. It 
22 can be done and it can be done in this particular case 
23 and that is exactly what is allowed in Nield and by 
24 following Richardson vs. Marsh, which is the 
25 definitive case. 
The courts have taken a very practical 
approach, Your Honor, and dealt with this 
3 | confrontation issue in joint trials by saying go ahead 
4 | and have a joint trial, just eliminate any reference 
5| in the nontestifying co-defendant's confession to the 
6 | other defendant. That satisfies the confrontation 
7 I clause. It creates a practical problem for the 
8 I defense, as Mr. Snider has pointed out, because the 
9 I jury stis there in a joint trial and hears all sorts 
10 of evidence about both of them. The only thing they 
11 don't hear is that in Mr. Telford's confessions is a 
12 reference to Brandon Dahlquist. You simply hear 
13 references to himself doing various things, such as 
14 picking up the victim, driving with him in a Blazer 
15 and so on . 
16 But that's a risk one takes when one 
17 engages in criminal activity. That's the risk that is 
18 inherent in being tried. It may be, frankly, 
19 criticized as somewhat cynical, but that's the way 
20 it's done- It is entirely appropriate. It's fair and 
21 meets the confrontation clause. 
22 Again, Mr. Dahlquist doesn't want it to 
23 happen. That's why he wants a separate trial. But he 
24 takes that risk when he does something that gets him 
25 chargedwith criminal activity. 
1 I These cases allow exactly what we have 
2 I proposed to do. It doesn't matter whether there's 
3 I three or ten co-defendants. It doesn't matter to what 
extent the confession may or may not incriminate one 
or the other defendants. The rule is laid out very 
clearly in Nield and in Richardson vs. Marsh. If the 
statements are redacted and if there is a limiting or 
cautionary instruction, that's it. The law allows 
that to happen . 
The practical effect on the jury of that 
is the defendant's problem. We accomplish the goal of 
moving things along through the judicial system 
appropriately and at the same time solve the 
confrontation issue. Like I say, it's subject to some 
criticism as being cynical, and it's true that the 
trial judge does have the discretion whether to grant 
separate trials, but in effect what these cases are 
saying to a trial judge is if you want to go ahead 
with a joint trial, then you can do it and we're not 
going to overturn your decision so long as the 
statements are properly redacted and you have given a 
cautionary instruction. We'll allow you trial judges 
to move along and we are going to still worship at the 
altar of judicial economy. That's in effect what the 
appelate courts are saying. 
Regardless of how many co-defendants are 
2 I involved or the particular quotation that counsel read 
3 | from Richardson vs. Marsh, it is allowed and it's 
4 I something that is not all that uncommon. It's an 
5 entirely appropriate way to proceed. As a practical 
6 matter, I'll redact the statements I want to use in my 
7 case in chief because I won't know whether Mr. Telford 
8 will testify or not. If he testifies, then I believe 
9 I would be able to use the entire statement in 
10 cross-examining him. And also at that point the whole 
11 issue would he separate because we no longer have a 
12 nontestifying co-defendant's confession. All of a 
13 sudden we have a testifying co-defendant. But if it 
14 turns out he doesn't testify, they've been redacted 
15 I and we've resolved the issue and given a cautionary 
16 instruction when we're done. I would submit that 
17 solves i t . 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Bouwhuis. 
19 MR. BOUWHUIS: Just briefly, Your Honor. Our 
20 position, and we've discussed this beforehand, is that 
21 Travis has given a rather sufficient number of 
22 statements to various people. We believe, through 
23 those statements, we'll be able to get out what we 
24 want in order to establish his defense. Our intention 
25 at this time, and obviously I can't make a firm 
1 I commitment because trials don't always proceed the way 
2 | we want them to. but our intention is that he won't 
testify. We feel like we can get what we need out of 
the statements. 
However, the discussion here has been 
6 | about the rights to Mr. Dahlquist if the statements 
7 | are redacted of references made to him. I want to 
8 | point out that this also affects Mr. Telford. The way 
it affects him, if his statements are redacted and 
brought in at trial, then we have the problem of these 
large gaps. This in effect forces Travis Telford to 
testify against his will. We don't intend to testify 
if we can get in through his statements what we feel 
we can, what we need. Then he doesn't have to testify 
and subject himself to cross-examination. He has a 
Fifth Amendment right not to testify. However, if 
these redacted statements come in, he'll have no 
choice but to explain the gaps. 
Now, the Ellis case, which I believe the 
court has a copy of, makes reference to the court's 
discretion in ordering a severance. By the way, our 
position is that we join the motion for severance. We 
want the severance. The court indicates, and this is 
mentioned here, that it is the trial court's 
discretion to order separate trials. I'm reading from 
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1 page 190 on the right-hand side under rules of 
2 criminal procedure, 9B. Defendants will be tried 
3 jointly unless the court, in its discretion, orders 
4 separate trials. 
5 Rule 9D, however, requires separate trials 
6 if it appears tha: the defendants will be prejudiced 
7 by joinder. If the trial court errors in denying a 
8 severance they would disregard the error unless it 
9 affects the substantial rights of the defendant. That 
10 refers to Utah Criminal Procedure 30(a). 
11 Our position is that Travis Telford has a 
12 substantial right, a very substantial right, to not 
13 incriminate himself, to not testify. If these 
14 redacted statement are brought in he effectively loses 
15 that right. He'll have to get up and testify about 
16 the gaps, because these statements will say I picked 
17 him up, but there will be some distance in between 
18 that he's going to have to explain. 
19 The court does go can on and define, in my 
20 opinion, one of the substantial rights and refers to 
21 the specific case. "If we are pursuaded that had the 
22 court granted a severance an outcome more favc ble to 
23 the defendant would have been reasonably likely." 
24 That's another right that I think is affected. 
25 So my argument is that there are two 
l| substantial rights. One is his right to testify or 
2 | not. The other is that we believe the jury may, if 
3 | Mr. Dahlquist testifies and if he's allowed to bring 
4 I his alibi defense in, that may be a big nail in Mr. 
5 | Telford's coffin, because his entire defense is that 
Mr. Dahlquist is the one who was there and had the gun 
and pulled the trigger. If the jury believes that he 
was not there, then he's given some conflicting 
statements that, I think, is the nail in his coffin, 
because if they believe Mr. Dahlquist wasn't there, 
then Travis is lying about the whole thing. All we 
know is that he was there and all the evidence will be 
that he and Troy Weston and some unknown person were 
there. 
So if this is not severed and Mr. 
Dahlquist gets his alibi defense in, I think there's a 
reasonable likelihood that Travis could be convicted 
of murder. If they're severed, Mr. Dahlquist doesn't 
have his alibi evidence in and it will be easier for 
him to -- for us to convince the jury that it was Mr. 
Dahlquist that did it, therefore bringing about a 
reasonable likelihood that he may not be convicted of 
murder. 
Our position is that we're asking the 
court to exercise its discretion and grant a severance 
because of the two rights of Mr. Telford that will be 
affected. His Fifth Amendment right to not testify 
and the prejudice that would occur if they are tried 
4 I together . 
5| THE COURT: A response from the defense? 
6| MR. YENGICH: Just a brief rejoinder. Mr. 
7 I Bunderson, may I see your copies of the redacted 
8 statements? If the court please, I've listened with 
9 interest to this and I think that Mr. Bunderson made 
10 the point for us. We don't worship at the altar of 
11 judicial economy. We worship at the altar of the 
12 presumption of innocence. 
13 Both of these young men are presumed 
14 innocent as we sit here. Both of them are entitled to 
15 put on their best defense. The day that we, in Utah 
16 or in the United States, are more concerned with 
17 judicial economy than we are about having a fair 
18 trial, about fairness being presented from the witness 
19 stand, and I'm not saying that's where the court is 
20 coming from, but if that day should come, then we'll 
21 do away with all the rules of evidence. 
22 The fact of the matter is that under 
23 article one, section 12 of our constitution, and under 
24 the confrontation clause of the United States, what it 
25 says is basically this: If you put in a statement of 
Bunderson puts them into evidence, counsel for the 
co-defendant gets to ask the people who took those 
statements, who read them into evidence, the entirety 
of the statements. The entirety of the statements, a 
I understand the defense of the co-defendant, is that 
our client did it. Counsel can correct me if I'm 
wrong, but I think that's the sum and substance of 
the ir defens e . 
Mr. Bunderson isn't the only one who gets 
to redact the statements nor is the court. Once he 
offers them, they come in and they come in in their 
totality. I think that is the problem. 
Mr. Bunderson is a wise prosecutor. He 
wants these two people in the same courtroom pointing 
a finger at one another. But he shouldn't get it in 
this case. This is a case — this is the classic cas 
where the cases should be severed. Mr. Telford wants 
to put on the defense that he can put on without 
having to testify. Mr. Bunderson will offer the 
statements. Mr. Telford has a Fifth Amendment right 
in that regard. He can testify through the 
statements, but to testify through those statements 
he's got to inculpate my client and we can't 
cross-examine him on those. 
I would offer one other thing, Your Honor 
everyone involved, including Your Honor. My attempts 
2 I at redaction certainly are something that are subject 
3 I to further argument from counsel, or further 
4 sanitizing, if you will, from the court. But in any 
5 event, we can arrive at a transcript, two transcripts, 
6 that are redacted. Mr. Telford's counsel should then 
7 be limited, I propose, on a motion in limine, and if 
8 it takes a motion I so move right now as part of my 
9 argument, to cross-examine as to what is in the 
10 redacted statements. He should not, I submit, 
11 approach the witnesses and say, in effect, well, 
12 didn't he also tell you that Brandon Dahlquist shot 
13 him. I don't think he can do that. 
14 Mr. Dahlquist has a right to have those 
15 statements redacted and has the right to not have 
16 co-defendant's counsel raising that issue, unless, 
17 when he gets to his case in chief, Mr. Telford's 
18 counsel puts on Mr. Telford. Once he puts on Mr. 
19 Telford then it's all out the window. 
20 I think that's the appropriate way to look 
21 at it. That's how the whole matter would play out. 
22 So Mr. Bouwhuis, I submit, is correct in his assertion 
23 that if that all happens he'll have to put Mr. Telford 
24 on the stand to explain it. 
25 Now, both of them are complaining about 
fairness. That isn't fair to me, that isn't fair to 
2 I me. What they want is the best possible approach for 
3| them. That's advocacy, that's what it is all about. 
4| If they have separate trials it is better for them. 
5I They both have a better chance of walking out with no 
6 conviction if they're separated. That's their 
7 approach. I don't know if in an analysis, a scholarly 
8 analysis, that's really true, but that is what they're 
9 thinking. Obviously what I'm thinking about is 
10 judicial economy and I want to be done with it. I 
11 want to try them both together. 
12 If you look at the fairness issue, I 
13 submit what could be more fair, what could be a fairer 
14 way to resolve all this, than have both of them put on 
15 the spot in front of the same jury and have the same 
16 jury decide who is lying and who is not? Have the 
17 same jury hear all the evidence against both of them. 
18 I submit that if you're looking at fundamental 
19 fairness that's far more fundamentally fair to 
20 everyone involved, including the people of Utah, than 
21 the approach of separating the two trials. 
22 Now, Mr. Yengich is correct to some 
23 extent. Our criminal law focuses upon fairness to the 
24 defendants, but it is not entirely a one-way street. 
25 It focuses more precisely upon a defendant's rights. 
l| Those rights, as embodied in our rules of evidence and 
2 I our constitution, are that they have a right to have 
3 I the statement redacted. They have the right to 
4 cautionary instructions. On the other hand, the 
5 people have rights too- The people have a right to 
6 judicial economy. The court has to balance those 
7 rights. Very often the balance will fall in favor of 
8 the defendant, but in this particular instance the 
9 court has charted a course that would allow us to 
10 worship at the altar of judicial economy and worship 
11 at the altar of fairness to the defendants. I submit 
12 it's very well laid out in Nield and Richardson. 
13 Thank you . 
14 THE COURT: I'm going to hear from each defense 
15 counsel briefly. 
16 MR. YENGICH: May I review Solario? 
17 THE COURT: Yes. 
18 MR. YENGICH: I did not do the trial, but I did 
19 handle the appeal. There is a rule, counsel indicates 
20 that he will argue, a rule of completeness. Counsel 
21 puts in a statement from the co-defendant and the 
22 defense of the co-defendant can't be elicited through 
23 the statement, so he's entitled to bring it up. 
24 There's just no question about that. That's the law. 
25 Counsel does not get an opportunity to 
l| it, that's error, flat out error. 
2| He's not going to call his client, we 
3| won't have the chance to cross-examine him- It's a 
classic case- This is not the case where an 
5I individual says, well, I was in the car and there was 
6 a burglary. T was in the car and John was in the 
7 building. You can redact John is in the building, 
8 that simple statement. I was in the car is good 
9 enough in that. 
10 That's not the case here. We're talking 
11 about a number of statements that are totally, and I 
12 think Mr. Bunderson would agree with me, inculpate our 
13 client. They say he did it. If I'm counsel for them 
14 I'd put that into evidence and he's got a right to. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Bouwhuis. 
16 MR. BOUWHUIS: Just briefly, Your Honor. I don't 
17 see how the court can limit me as counsel for Travis 
18 Telford on cross-examination, to say that I cannot 
19 question these witnesses on issues that go to the very 
20 heart of his defense. That denies him the right to a 
21 fair trial and I think that's clearly an appealable 
22 issue . 
23 I don't think that -- I think we can avoid 
24 that very easily. The bottom line is that if it 
25 denies him the right to a fair trial, and I don't 
think that we can under any circumstances limit 
cross-examination here and say that all I can do is 
3 | ask questions strictly on the very words, nothing 
41 more, nothing less, that they'll say on the witness 
5 stand. I haven't seen that, in my limited experience, 
6 in any trial. Certainly where it goes to the heart of 
7 his defense that shouldn't be allowed. I don't see 
8 how the court can rule that I'll be limited on my 
9 cross-examination simply to the words that the 
10 witnesses say. 
11 THE COURT: The court will rule as follows. I'm 
12 going to require that the trials not be severed, that 
13 we go forward. I will require the redaction of all of 
14 Telford's statements so as to eliminate any reference 
15 to Dahlquist. 
16 MR. SNIDER: I think not only reference, but his 
17 existence also. 
18 THE COURT: I understand that. I'll require that 
19 the proposed redacted statements be provided to the 
20 defense counsel, Mr. Bunderson, tomorrow evening, five 
21 o'clock. Will that be sufficient time? 
22 MR. BUNDERSON: The only limiting factor, Your 
23 Honor, is the availability of the typist. 
24 THE COURT: You may have to hire a separate 
25 typist if necessary. We're in a time crunch here. 
w h 1 c h was a question that I ;n i g h t h a v e asked m yself . 
he did not seem, to be angry in any sense, nor did I 
notice him raise his voJL c e In any manner or shake his 
head. I would like the record to reflect that that.. 
at least, was my observation. 
THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
MR. 3UNDERS0N: To follow that up, my observation 
was that, I thought he was at least slightly offended 
by that exchange. The other thing, Your Honor, Mr. 
Yengich either proffered or read to Mr. Bouwhuis the 
fact that Grace Wilson read certain magazines. He 
listed the Salt Lake Tribune as being one that she 
read. The Salt Lake Tribune, Hews and Journal, Time 
and U.S. Today. My notes indicate that that was Paul 
Peterson, who was seated right next to Grace Wilson. 
THE COURT: ;il right . Counsel, we'll hear from 
you now on other motions. We have to pick the pace 
up. We have a jury waiting to come out. I know 
there's other motions to address. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Just before I get into the motion 
that I intended to address here, we do have a concern 
with Mr. Bunderson's box and the name on the front 
saying "Telquist" that is facing the jury. It seems 
to be somewhat of a subli minal suggestion to the jury 
that these guys are together and tied in this. 



















be glad to take the box down. 
THE COURT: It would seem simple enough to remove 
the box. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: In con junction with that, I would 
move for a mistrial based on that display. 
MR. YENGTCH: I would join in the motion. 
MR. B T J N u E R S 0 N : So the record is clear, Your 
H o n o t . I h a v e a c a c d board box s i 11 i n g o n • ;: y des k . I 
wrote the name "Telquist" because I'm too lazy to 
write Triform, slash, Dahlquist. I thought 1 
clevei. !' a •* b e that's another on. 
was 
i o K e s a o c n ^  
1 - - y h c d at. We may refer to Mr. Snider *» n d 
Mr. Y r- n j ; h ~ s "r.igich. At least I might get a c o u p b 
of chuc!:lr; ^: v. f that one. We haven't come up yet 
for a na: t f r. r Mr. Face and Mr. Bouwhuis. 
T b cr r e was absolutely no intention to do 
anything subliminal in that sense. And in event, they 
are being tried together. They're both here in the 
courtroom. I've removed the box from the table, if 
that's the problem. 
MR. YENGTCH: So the record is clear, it does say 
on the side of it in green, on the one side, 
"Telquist." On the other side it also says 
"Telquist." The whole purpose of a joint trial, and 
w e Vr a r g u e o t n is ? o r 5? o m e t i m e a n d yo u i"i e a r 
sonic a; ore, is ;:hat these people: a r *- entitled to 
individual t r i a 1 s a n d i~n dividual j u d g m e n t s . Counsel 
is going t o argue that w i t h m ore v i g o r 11 o w , but w e 
join in the motion for a mistrial. The idea is that 
they get individual determinations as to their 
judgment. 
I'll accept what Mr. Bunderson has to say, 
that it's either laziness or a joke that he wrote it 
that way, but the fact cf the matter is that it still 
has an impact on the jury and it has been sitting 
there and they've been looking at it up until now. 
THE COURT: The motion is denied on that. I will 
direct , Mr . Bunderson, that the box not be placed on 
the table until the name is either corrected or 
removed. 
MR. BUNDERSON: That's fine. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. As the 
court is aware, there have been several motions inade 
throughout the course of this case. I believe they've 
been made by counsel for the defendant Dahlquist. We 
have joined in those motions and we renew our motion 
at this time to sever the case. The reasons are many. 
Basically, the court should sever this 
case because the two defenses nre clearly antagonistic 
toward each other. Mr. Telford's defense is that he 
was there at the scene and Mr. Dalilquist is the one 
who killed the victim. - Mr. Eahlquis t ' :-* defense is 
that he was not there and either Travis Telford did it 
or some other person. Those are clearly antagonistic 
to each other. 
The two defendants have competing 
constitutional rights. I think the court has tried to 
balance that,, but under I; h e o i r c u in s t a n c e s t h eir 
constitutional lights can't be balanced. One c f them 
gets them and the other one doesn't. The court has 
made a ruling that Mr. Dahlquist have his 
constitutional right to confrontation through 
redacting statements. Mr. Telford's right to 
confrontation, under the Sixth Amendment, is lost in 
the process and, in addition to that, Mr. Telford has 
the right against self-incrimination. 
As I will point out i n a few moments, this 
one particular statement that has been redacted, if it 
comes, will almost force Mr. Telford to give up his 
right to testify because it comes in as a blatant 
confession to murder. 
THE COURT: Let me just clarify, Mr. Bouwhuis. I 
think, because of the time constraints, on the 
redaction issue we'll reserve that and perhaps address 
'•'. h a v. i n t h e iii orning before the jury is here. The 
difficulty is if we address all w f these issues we m a y 
h av h a j u ry brought i n-near five and excused for the 
d a y and that was not the iiistructi,; n s t h e y w e i e g i v e n 
or the expectation. 
MR. D O U I T H U I S : I understand the court's 
frustration with the way this trial is going. The 
problem.is that the severance, the redactions and 
their constitutional rights all tie together and go to 
the issue of severance. That's our primary argument, 
that this case should be severed because of those 
reasons. I don't hava a problem with addressing the 
redaction tomorrow morning. The problem is that we 
are scheduled to give opening statements this 
afternoon. How that issue is decided on redaction may 
very well decide what comes in under the opening 
statements. I believe it will affect my opening 
statements and I'm sure it will affect counsel for 
Dahlquist and it may or may not affect Mr. Bunderson's 
opening statement. I don't know how we can separate 
these out, because they all go to the issue of 
severance. 
THE COURT: I understand that. We'll have a 
separate hearing on the redaction issue, probably 
tomorrow morning, because that may take some time to 
review those documents and to adjust any wording that 
the court determines :i\ay be necessary. At this point 
in the proceedings, the court has denied the .action to 
sever on multiple occasions. I don't intend Lo spend 
extensive time this afternoon revisiting that issue 
with the jury waiting out in the jury room. 
MR. BOUWKUIS: I understand that concern. Our 
concern is to get on the record our motion for the 
severance. 
THE C 0 U F T : I t h i n k the record is clear-. 
MR . BOUWnUT 5: I suppose we'll have to deal with 
it tomorrow morning. I don't see how we can separate 
redaction from the severance. The severance goes to 
these defendants' constitutional rights, which are 
directly affected by the redacted statements. I don't 
know how we can begin to address this issue unless 
we're able to do it all at once. 
Again, T understand the court's 
frustration and this is taking longer than normal, but 
I also want to stress to the court and everybody here 
that, with all due respect to the jury, if they've got 
to wait another 20 minutes to ensure that these 
defendants' constitutional rights are protected, 
that's America. What I'm urging on the court is that 
we first look out for the defendants' constitutional 
rights. I in s a r e Mr, Bundci son would agree. His 
n. c e r e s u a e r e L s that "iusticc is done. I don't 
in e a n a n y d isrespect t o
 ma nvbody . but T just don't — I 
just d on'L t h ia k this issue c a n be d e a 1t wL t h fairly 
unless we deal with it all at once. 
THE CO UP 7: Counsel . T guess my concern is to 
some extent you don't know what any of the testimony 
is that will come in. In other words, whenever an 
9 I opening statement is madc , counsel gives an opening 
10 | statement about what they anticipate. It's the 
111 court's belief and understanding that the 
±2 | prosecution's proposed redacted statements were 
13 | provided r r. you -ibcut four days ago. 
14 | W-, «* T'vr indicated to you that I will 
hold a separ itt >. rn: ing to review those and to 
determine If !»L. .\ C e d S to l> e further adjust m ents. 
I've already g i v«- n y o u a ruling o n that m otion to 
sever on the redaction issue. As to the exact wording 
±9 I or adjustments on those statements, I've indicated 
20 1 that there would be a separate opportunity for a 
2l| hearing on that issue. It doesn't seem to the court 
that that must occur before opening statements. 
•2 3 | MR. BOUwHUIS: I would agree with the court on 
24| that. I know we've discussed what is going to be 
2 5| redacted and how I can approach that on 
(April o, iyjD. 
THE COURT: Th <= J. C v- ord may reflect that t h < 
defendants are present along with ail counsel. The 
4 I jury has not yet been brought into the courtroom. 
5 | There were one or two issues you wanted to address 
before we brought the jury in? 
MR. BUNDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. I have one and 
I think Mr. Bouwhuis has one. I had indicated to the 
court that as far as the Telford statements are 
10 | concerned there wouldn't be anything come in other 
111 than what Dave Hansen has to say. I've suggested thai 
12 I he simply read the exhibit that is marked as 3 4 A . 
13 Then the issue of cross-examination arises from that 
14 and I don't know how counsel are going to handle that. 
1 5 | That's how we're going to present it. I think Mr. 
Bouwhuis has something in line with that. 
THE COURT: Let's address that., first., then, to 
18 resolve them on «T «-!»., a tiir.i It seems to me that the 
JL r 
4 ± 
suggestion is probably well taken, that we have the 
witness read the redacted statement. The reason I 
suaaest that is it is mv concern that if he doesn't 
22 and tries to paraphras c . w c run into the problems that 
23 we're trving to avoid 
24 I MR. BOUWHUIS: I understand the prosecution's 
concern and the court's concern. For the record. I do 
want a standing objection to this whole redaction, all 
the redacted state ments. My concern is. and I think 
we can resolve this through my cross-examination, my 
4 I concern is that the jury not get the perception that 
5 | this was a written statement that Travis gave or that 
6 | this was a transcript of a statement he gave. 
THE COURT: That's certainly fair game for 
cross-examination. I don't see any problem with that. 
MR. BOUWKUIS: There are some other issues I have 
that are related to the redacted statement. 
THE COURT: All right. With regards to cress? 
MR. BOUWKUIS: Yes. Mr. Bunderson earlier, in 
chambers, net today but on another day during the 
trial, indicated, at least to me. and I don't know if 
he indicated this to the court, but his intension was 
16 | - - when this redacted statement comes in. and 
17 [ obviously it's not the truth, but if Travis gets on 
IS [ the stand the jury is going to be completely baffled 
19 as to what happened here. I think his intention is to 
20 ask for an instruction at some point, I guess with the 
21 other jury instructions, that they be told what 
22 happened and why. 
23 MR. BUNDERSON: Or even at that point. 
2 4 MR. BOUWKUIS: Yes. My concern is if he wants to 












have the perception that they were somehow lied to, we 
have the same concern. I would like the court to make 
a ruling at this point that if the court, and I think 
the court has sufficient information to make a ruling 
on this motion, which it hasn't made yet, but will be 
made if Travis testifies, that if the court is going 
to give the instruction, which does inure to the 
benefit of defendant Dahlquist and his counsel, if the 
court is going to order that the jury be so instructed 
to correct that misperception, then I'm asking +- v. -
court that, following Detective Hansen's testimony. 
the jury be instructed that his testimony was based on 
a document which has been redacted. In other words.. 
portions have been deleted for certain constitutional 
reasons which can't be explained. 
That doesn't refer to the existence of 
Dahlquist or anything. What that does is the same 
thing that Mr. Bunderson will be asking, and that is 
IS J that the jury — that the gross degree of 
z u \ misperception be cleared up somewhat and they not be 
ZJL| in a position where they m isperceive this to be a 
22 I confession. And we're not asking that they not be 
2 3 | told it isn't a confession. I'll do that and I'll be 
24 | allowed to do that. We're asking the court, if it 
allow an instruction to come in for their benefit, if 
Travis testifies, to clear that up that the jury be 
given an instruction, following Detective Hansen's 
testimony, to clear up the misperception. I think it 
can be done without harming the defendant Dahlquist. 
MR- BUNDERSON: The State would request such an 
instruction but only at the time that Mr. Telford 
takes the stand. I don't think it's appropriate until 
that occurs. Once it occurs I think it'5 appropriate 
to instruct the jury with something less complicated 
than that., but something like this: Because of the 
interplay of the rules of evidence and constitutional 
rules, ladies and gentlemen, certain evidence is now 
going to come in that could not come in until the time 
Mr. Telford chose to take the stand. 
MR. BOUWKUIS: And I may be able to clear this up 
on cross-examination by a simple question to Detective 
Hansen, that the testimony he's just given regarding 
Travis Telford is not complete, is not a complete 
representation of what Travis said. If I'm allowed to 
ask that question I don't have to say anything 
further. What we're asking for here, and is also for 
the benefit of these guys., there's a certain personal 
benefit for Mr. Bunderson and these guys that this 
jury not go away thinking that he lied to them or that 
these guvs lied to them. 
THE COURT: I remembered that, but it seems to 

















before arrive at 
MR. BOUWHUIS: We've arrived at it the moment 
Detective Hansen finishes his testimony. 
THE COURT: Yes and no. It seems to the court, 
having reviewed again the case law on redaction; for 
me to suggest to the jury that that is in fact a 
redacted statement would fly directly in the face of 
the decision. The only thing I can do is give you a 
clarifying instruction. If at such stage of the 
proceedings your client takes the stand, waives his 
Fifth A;. tr r. d r c r. t right and actually begins to address 
those iii ,cs at some point it appears he's 
23 
24 
contracdi::i:.j that statement, clearly I will make a; 
explanation to the jury that places the blame on the 
court's shoulders for the redacted statement. 
MR. BOU'v'KUIS : To be honest with you. at that 
point, obviously, my preference is I don't get an 
instruction. If I don't get an instruction now I 
don't want one later. 
THE COURT: I understand, but I'm telling you I 
can't give them an instruction right now beyond the 
instruction that I've given them, which is that thev 
25 mav not use any statements made b v one defendant 




















MR. BOUvvKUIS: Hay I then be allowed to simply 
ask him if that's a complete representation of what 
Travis told him? 
MR. BUNDERSON: I think that would lead to an 
inference of the existence of a co-defendant under the 
circumstances of this case that the jury has already 
heard and the additional evidence that they're going 
to hear. That's precisely what needs to be avoided. 
It does present a hard choice to Mr. Telford, but 
we've already gone over all of that. 
THE COURT: Let me hear from counsel for Mr. 
Dahlqu i s t. 
MR. YENGICH: This is the reason that a severance 
motion is appropriate any time during the course of 
the trial. Counsel for the defendant Telford brings 
up exactly the problem that exists in this particular 
cas- He wants jury to have a fair rendition of 
the circumstances for his client, which is that what 
the State is offering isn't the totality of the 
statement. We are entitled for that not to occur for 
the very reason that Mr. Bunderson has just indicated 
It places him in a Kobson's choice because he can 
literally, if he has that type of statement from the 
court, he literally does not have to run the risk of 
putting his client on the witness stand and his client 
can exercise his right against self-incrimination and 
not take the witness stand and be happy with the 
statement that is entered into evidence with the one 
caveat. That's why this case, even at this point, 
should be severed. 
One or the other of the defendants in this 
case should be severed out of this case because 
neither one, at this juncture, can get a fair trial 
10 I under the way these statements are coming in. Our 
position on the redacted statement is similar to that 
12 of Mr. Bunderson, which is, if you indicate that it is 
13 I net the totality of the statement it may lead the jury 
14 I to believe in the existence of a co-defendant having 
15 something to do with it. That's exactly the problem 
16 that we've had in this case from the beginning and it 
17 specifically is what Richardson talks about. 
13 I want to quote State vs. Bayos and 
19 I O'Brien where they say that the "trial court must. 
when defendants are charged jointly, weigh the 
possible prejudice to any defendant with 
22| considerations of economy and practicality and 
23 I judicial administration," and they go on that if 
24 1 there's a problem with this then severance is 
25 I appropriate. We've reached that bridge now. We are 
now only at the beginning of the bridge, we're in the 
middle of it. We ask the court once again to grant a 
severance in this case. 
MR. BOUwKUIS: There is a rule. I think, that's 
applicable here. Rule 403 under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which has the exclusion of relevant evidence 
and the grounds for it. "Although relevant evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value substantially 
confuses the issues and misleads the jury," et cetera. 
This redacted statement is nothing less than a 
statement that is misleading to the jury. It gives 
them the impression that he confessed to the murder 
when he did not and everybody in here knows he did 
not. The jury won't know that. A simple corrective 
instruction or a simple question on cross-examination 
can take one small step to clearing that up without 
harming the defendant Dahlquist. 
MR. BUNDER SON: The point remains he did confess 
to murder because he confessed to being an accomplice 
on two different occasions. Once by saying I got rid 
of the gun and once by saying I went back to the truck 
and brought the extra clip. He's an accomplice and if 
that's all that came in he could still be guilty. 
THE COURT: The question to the detective as to 
whether the statement is complete will not be allowed. 
? a a e 7 5 5 
David Hansen - D 
A, About ten years. 
Q. Okay. I'll call your attention to the matter 
before the court and ask if you are familiar with 
Travis Telford? 
A• I am. 
Q. Is he here in the courtroom, and if so just 
point him out? 
A. Yes. Sitting right next to you. 
MR. BUNDER SON: May the record indicate that he's 
identified the defendant Telford? 
Tnc C O u m : ies. 
Q. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) Are you familiar with 
Brandon Dahlcuist? 
A. Only by name. 
Q. Regarding Travis Telford, did you have 
occasion to have a conversation with him on April 14th 
of 1994? 
A . I did. 
Q. Where did that occur? 
A. It occurred at various places, but in 
particular on 1-15. 
0. In an automobile? 
A. Yes. 
Yours 
David Hansen - D 
Q . Tell me and the jury what it was he told you 
on that day? 
A . Okay. 
MR. YENGICK: Your Honor, our objection is under 
Rule 105, the rule that this comes into evidence only 
against Mr. Telford and not against the defendant 
Dahlquist. We would ask that the jury be admonished 
in that regard. 
THE COURT: I'll give the jury the same 
instruction, remind them of the instruction I 
previously gave them, that any testimony that comes 
from — any statement made by one of the 
co-defendants when that co-defendant is net on the 
witness star.i - s c r. 1 y applicable against the 
individual whi * <* d *- the statement. In this case, the 
witness is r t f r : i ::. g to a statement which is alleged 
to have been m « d c- b v Mr. Telford. It may not be used 
in any manner against Mr.- Dahlquist. 
MR. YENGICK: And so the record is clear, we 
renew all cf the other objections that have been made. 
THE COURT: That is noted for the record. 
MR. YENGICK: Thank you. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: As do we, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So noted. 
0. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) You can go ahead now. 
David Hansen - D 
A . I will just read it so it will be easier for 
me to keep it straight. M0n April 14th. 1994, while 
enroute to Box Elder County jail with prisoner Travis 
Telford, he told me about the day of the homicide of 
Troy Weston. Since his arrest he's attempted numerous 
times to tell me of the incident. Each time he's 
attempted to tell me I would inform him that he had 
secured an attorney and must have his permission to 
talk to me about the incident. 
"About 4:15 while on 1-15 enroute to the 
jail, Travis, without being asked, started to talk 
about the homicide of Troy Weston. He said that Troy 
had inquired about buying a gun because he had some 
people who wan.ted to hurt him. He said he went and 
picked up Troy Weston at his house and headed cut to 
Wiilard to show him the gun. 
"He said that when he and Trey arrived out 
in Wiilard out came a small automatic .22 caliber 
handgun. He said that they had parked on the side of 
the road to shoot. They then got out and went over to 
shoot the gun and Troy asked how did it work. Travis 
said that when Troy asked if it worked, he was shot in 
the shoulder. He said Troy screamed and said what are 
you doing. Troy then was shot again. This time twice 
in the back, because Troy's body had then shifted 
David Hansen - X 
sideways. 
"He then said Troy continued to yell to 
stop if. He then said that one of the bullets must 
have hit Troy's spine because he quit moving and just 
dropped to the ground. Troy was then shot again twice 
more in the front and the gun jammed. He said it 
either jammed or ran out of ammunition. Travis went 
back to the Blazer and got another clip. When he got 
back to the Blazer the new clip was loaded and the gun 
was placed under Troy's chin and the trigger pulled 
one last time. He then said Troy did not move any 
more and he dragged the body about 30 feet to the 
ditch. He then got back to the Blazer and sped back 
to Ogden." 
MR. BUNOERSGN: Thank you. Your Honor, I reserve 
the right to recall Detective Hansen regarding some 
other matters, but that's all 1 have at the moment. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination. 
MR. D O U W H U I S 
JD i IVJrv . B O u w h u i i : 
i e s 
L R u i i> - c. A A H I IM /^  T I 0 IM 
Q. Detective Hansen, could you tell us, at this 
time Travis had already been arrested on this charge, 
had he not? 
A . i e s . 
Jaim Carrol1 - D 
A. Yes. he did. 
2 Q . Did he use that name? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Had you ever heard that name before that 
5 particular day? 
6 A. No, sir. 
7 Q. Did you know Troy Weston? 
8 A. No, sir. 
9 Q. Did you ever know Dahlquist before this --
10 before you met him in prison? 
11 A. No
 f sir. 
12 O. Do you know Travis Telford? 
13 A. No, sir. 
14 Q. What else did he tell you after he told you 
15 he was a suspect in that murder? 
16 A. He said that h e ' d g o t t e n a phone call that 
17 Troy was a rat. 
18 Q. Troy was a rat? 
19 A. Yes. A rat meaning — 
20 MR. YENGICH: Objection as to his interpretation 
21 THE COURT: Sustained. 
22 Q . (BY MR. BUNDERSON) Go ahead. What else did 
23 he tell you? 
2 4 | A . That he took him to Willard Bav. 
25 Q. Took who to WillarcJ Bay' 
Jaim Carroll - D 
A. In terms of my notes, he didn't say in the 
2 I same -- in a separate sentence he said I took Troy 
3 Weston to Willard Bay. He says he got a phone call 
4 that Troy was a rat anc3 then took him to Willard Bay. 
5 That's just as much as I can remember. 
6 Q. Okay. G o o n . 
7 A. He said that there was a thumb print on the 
8 target paper and he said that he shot the dude, Troy, 
9 | that is. in the knee, then the other leg, and then the 
10 shoulder and in the chest and in the head. He said it 
11 was a .22 caliber. He paused and then told me, "If 
12 you tell I will kill you or have someone kill you." 
13 MR. YENGICH: Let the record reflect that he was 
14 reading that statement. I think that's a fair 
15 assessment. 
16 THE COURT: The record may reflect that he was 
17 closelv followina his notes durina the entire 
18 stat ejnen t . 
19 O. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) And that is correct. 
20 you're trying to review your notes and tell us from 
21 your best recollection? 
22 A. Yes . 
23 Q. Okay. What was the next thing he said? 
24 A. Brandon said that he beat up Weston two weeks 
25 before the murder with a window cleaner squeege. 
Jaim Carroll - D 
l| Q. Do recall him saying anything more about 
2| that, where it occurred, anything like that? 
A. No. 
4| Q. Did he next tell you something about Troy 
5 | Wes ton ? 
6 I A. Yeah. "Brandon said that Troy Weston was a 
7| dope fiend. Was in debt and getting beat up and his 
8 life threatened because of debt." 
9 Q. Whose life? 
10 A . Troy's. 
11 Q. Because of debt? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. What did he tell you next about Mr. Weston? 
14 A. "Sc Weston became a federal informant because 
15 he was scared for his life because of dope debt." 
16 O. Okay. Who was scared for his life, now? 
17 A. Troy. 
18 Q. Did Mr. Dahlquist next tell you. based on 
19 your recollection and your notes, that there was some 
20 sort of evidence against him? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. What did he say about that? 
23 A; "Brandon said that the only solid 
24 circumstantial they have is his thumb print on a paper 


















Jaim Carrol1 - D 
on ? 
0. Yes . 
A. "Two cops in Morgan were a part of the drugs 








Was he referring to himself? 
Yes* "And when his parents left he cooked 
Also says he had a home in Ogden." 
Do you know where Morgan is, by the way? 
Yes, I do. 
Okay. Have you ever been their yourself? 
Ye s , I have. 
Have you ever lived there? 
No. I haven't. 
0. Okay. Go ahead. Did he tell you anything 
else? 
A. Yes. Brandon said there was a $10,000 hit on 
Weston because he got a phone call saying that Weston 
was a rat and that he was trying to set up a deal with 
19 Brandon to get him busted." 
20 Q. Okay. How did you take that? Who was going 
21 to get busted? 
22 A. Apparently Brandon was. 
23 0. Because of something Weston was doing? 
24 A. Yes . 
25 0. Okay. In terms of being a rat 
Jaim Carrol1 - X 
concerned, is that basically all that Mr. Dahlquist — 
that you recall Mr. Dahlquist telling you on the 13th? 
A. O n w h i c h d a t e ? 
4 | Q. June 13 . 
5| A. Yes. 
6 I Q. Okay, Did you continue to not cellmate, but 
7 live in the same dorm with him or be in close 
8 association with Mr. Dahlquist for a period of time? 
9 I A, I don't know how long, but he was moved, yes. 
10 MR. BUNDERSON: I think that's all I have. Thank 
11 you. 














THE COURT: Mr. Bouwhuis, go ahead. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOUWHUIS: 
Q. You're here on your own, are you not? You 
came here of your own will to testify? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as far as you know, you weren't given any 
favors in return for your testimony? 
A. Yes, sir . 
Q. You testified earlier this morning, when Mr. 
Bunderson was questioning you, that Brandon had told 
you that Troy was trying to set up a deal to bust him 
Jaim Carroll - X 
and he told you that Troy was a rat, is that correct? 
2 A- Brandon told me that, yes. 
3 Q. And he told you that Troy Weston was trying 
4 to set up a deal to get Brandon busted, is that 
5 correct? That's what you testified on direct? 
6 A. (No response.) 
7 Q# Would it help to look at your notes? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 MR. BOUWHUIS: May I approach the witness? 
10 THE COURT: You may. 
11 Q. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) I'm looking at the second 
12 to last —excuse me. I'm showing you my copy of your 
13 notes. If you could read this highlighted section 
14 here to yourself. 
15 A. {Witness complied.) 
16 Q. That refreshes your recollection? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And you did in fact say that Brandon had told 
19 you that there was a $10,000 hit on Weston, is that 
20 1 correct? 
21 A. (Witness nodded his head.) 
22 o. You have to answer out loud. 
23 A* Yes. 
24 Q # Okay. That Troy Weston was a rat? 
25 A . Yes. 
J a i m Carroll - X 
Q. And that Troy Weston was trying to set up a 
deal to get Brandon busted? 
A. Yes. 
4 Q. He said all those things? 
5| A. Yes. 
Q. And we're talking about Brandon Dahlquist? 
A. Yes. Yes, sir. 
8 I Q. You also testified that Brandon had said that 
9 | when Travis got popped, or in your understanding 
10 arrested, Travis spilled his guts and told everything 
11 he knew, is that your recollection? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. Do you recall Brandon Dahlquist 
14 telling you that he wanted Travis Telford dead? 
15 A. (No response.) 
16 Q. Let me ask this question. You were 
17 interviewed by Jim Summerill, this man right here? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. When was that? Was it last December? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Do you recall that interview? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Do you recall telling him in that interview 
24 that Brandon Dahlquist had told you he wanted Travis 
25 Telford dead? 
























Q. You do recall that? 
A . Y e s . 
Q. Okay. Do you recall Brandon Dahlquist 
telling you anything about sending headstones to 
people for Christmas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You recall that? 
A. (Witness nodded his head.) 
Q. Do you recall who he said he sent those to? 
MR. SNIDER: May I voir dire on this? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SNIDER: Mr. Carroll, you had an interview 
with a police officer twice, correct? 
THE WITNESS: I was taken away from the prison, 
yes . 
MR. SNIDER: And somebody interviewed you? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. SNIDER: And do you recall in that interview 
talking about headstones in reference to Mr. 
Dahlquist? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. SNIDER: And in that interview do you recall 
saying that Mr. Dahlquist didn't say anything about 
it, that you were making reference to letters that Mr. 
Jaim Carroll - X 
0. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) Do you want me to repeat 
the question? 
A . Please. 
0. The question is, did Brandon Dahlquist tell 
you — let me rephrase it. Brandon Dahlquist told you 
that he was the one that shot Troy Weston, did he not? 
A. Yes. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Snider or Mr. Yengich. 
MR. SNIDER: Just a moment, Your Honor. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SNIDER: 
Q. Mr. Carroll, a little earlier today you had 
on a Viewmont high school jacket? 
A. Yes
 T sir. 
Q. And that was yours? 
A. Ye s, sir. 
Q. And you had a letter on it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You're not still going to Viewmont high 
school ? 
A . No, sir . 
Q. Are you going to school at all right now? 
A. No, sir. 
Jaim Carroll - X 
1 I meth right before the murder was to take place. Threw 
body in ditch with two feet of water close to Willard 



















0. Okay. But that's not necessarily exactly 
what the conversation was, that's just what you 
remember? 
A. No, that's what he told me. 
Q. And Brandon told you, your testimony is, that 
he shot Troy Weston in one knee and then in the other 
knee and then the leg and then he went to the chest? 
A, My testimony is right here. Do you want me 
to paraphrase? 
0. Your testimony is not right there. Your 
notes are there. I'm asking for your testimony. 
A. Okay. 
0. Wasn't that your testimony, that Brandon told 
you he shot him in one knee and then the other knee 
and in the leg and then in the chest and the head? 
A. My testimony? 
0. Yes. 
A- Not referring to my notes? 
0. Not referring to your notes. Isn't that what 
you said? 
A. He admitted that he killed him, yes. 
0. I'm sorry? 
Jaim Carroll - X 
A. What was the question you asked me? 
2 I 0 . 1 think you answered it. 
3 A . I wasn't getting any kind of response or 
4 anything and I was getting frustrated because of 
5 everything that was going on around me. I started to 
6 believe — I went to Captain Green and asked him if 
7 he'd heard anything and he says no. 
8 0. Wait a minute. You told Mr. Bunderson clear 
9 | back in June of last year in a letter that you knew i 
10 was a, quote, federal narcotics -- an investigator on 
11 a narcotics squad, didn't you? 
12 A. Brandon said he was — what did I say? 
13 Q. Ycu read it. You said in that letter, you 
14 told Mr. E~r. derscn in the letter, that the victim was 
15 a member cf the federal — I don't want to misquote 
16 you. A federal investigator on a narcotics squad? 
17 A. Yes. 
IS 0. And when that didn't pan out, then you turn 
19 to Captain Green and changed the story a little bit? 
20 A. No. I realized that it wasn't a federal 
21 agent, but it was an informant that was scared. 
22 0 . 1 want to refer back and forth to these two 
23 interviews. The first interview you had with Teresa 
24 Sargent, you had all of your notes that you have 
25 todav? 
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back? 
A. That's correc t 
3 I Q . Did he stay with the Blazer until it got into 
4 | the sheriff's garage and was secured? 
5 I A. Yes, sir. 
6 0 . Again, based on your knowledge of what he 
7 told you and the facts of the case, did anyone get 
8 into the Blazer? 
9 I A. No one got in the Blazer and he was 
10 instructed to do just that. 
11 0. You mean keep people out of it and not get in 
12 it himself? 
13 A. That's right. Keep people out and secure it 
14 in the garage. 
15 0. The garage was locked and no one was in there 
16 until Lynn Yeates and Richard Wright searched it, is 
17 that correct? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 0. I'm going to show you an exhibit marked 37A. 
20 Does that consist of some excerpts from some letters? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 MR. BUNDERSON: At this point I think we've 
23 discussed the fact that I would read what is on 37A. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 MR. BUNDERSON: If we may indicate to the jury, 
they'll have this with them, but I'll read it into the 
record now. 
THE COURT: This is the actual exhibit that was 
marked ? 
MR. BUNDERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Description, excerpts from letter 
from Travis Telford. "I'm sorry truly. But the death 
of Troy has been hanging on my mind, driving me crazy. 
I am going to tell the police the truth. If I don't I 
get life. Actually the death penalty \*ill probably be 
imposed. I have a very guilty conscience. I will 
take the rap for destroying the gun." T, in quotation 
marks, Travis Telford. "I'm sorry, but there is no 
other way." 
MR. YENGICH: We would ask the jury to again be 
instructed, under Rule 105, that that evidence does 
not come in against the defendant Dahlquist. 
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, as 
I've indicate to you previously, any type of statement 
made by one of these defendants and not coming 
directly from the witness stand may be used as 
evidence only against the co-defendant making the 
statement. In this case, Mr. Bunderson is reading 
























not in any manner use that evidence against Brandon 
Dahlquist. That evidence is limited strictly to your 
decision concerning Travis Telford. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Description, excerpts of letter 
from Travis to Nicole McCord. "The next part of this 
letter I hope you don't hold against me because I lied 
to you and everybody else but please keep it quiet 
until after court. I hope you and everyone else will 
forgive me for lying to you and to them, but I was 
scared. I didn't want to admit to being there. As a 
friend please don't tell anyone. I will do that when 
I get out. And please forgive me for lying to you. 
If word gets out that I was there it could put me in 
prison for life. I'll do it myself in a couple of 
weeks when I'm free. I'm sorry to tell you and have 
you keep it a secret, but I have to tell someone. I'm 
going crazy knowing this and not being able to tell 
anyone and that is the reason I didn't want to go to 
the funeral. But please don't tell anyone and I will 
be forever in your debt. Thinking of you a lot, 
Travi s 
Then a second document. "Nicole, I'm 
sitting here again. It's about 4:30 a.m. I woke up 
having the nightmare about Troy's death. How I was 
sitting there discussing if he wanted to buy the gun 
Dale Ward - FReD 
1 how he would pay for it. I bet I still have skid 
2 marks in my pants that I was wearing. You never know, 
3 though, they might still try to press it on me. Just 
4 because I held out on telling them what they need to 
5 know. Maybe if I just die I won't have to. But if I 
6 do that then my daughter will be without a father. 
7 Thinking of you a lot. P.S., send me Jimmy's 
8 address." 
9| MR. YENGICH: And the court doesn't need to state 
10 the same admonishment, but we would ask that the jury 
11 understand. 
12 THE COURT: All three of those excerpts are to be 
13 used solely against Travis Telford, not against Mr. 
14 Dahlquist. 
15 MR. BUNDERSON: I would move for the introduction 
16 of Exhibit No. 37A. 
17 THE COURT: That is received. 
18 Q. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) You are familiar with 
19 those excerpts? 
20 A. Yes, sir. 
21 Q. Were those excerpts from letters written by 
22 Travis Telford from the Box Elder County jail after he 
23 was arrested in this particular case? 
24 A. Yes, sir, they are. 
25 Q. What approximate time frame were they written 
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in, if you can recall? 
A . I don' t recall. 
Q. All right. It was after his arrest, though? 
A. It was after his arrest. 
Q. And when was he arrested? 
A. If I can refer to my notes, please? 
Q. Yes. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: We would stipulate that he was 
arrested March 31st. 
10 I MR. 3UNDERS0N: I'm not sure. 
Ill MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
12j THE WITNESS: From my notes it would seem that's 
13 correct, t h €• "1st. cf March. 
14 O. 'BV ••'? . F'V.TEESON) Thank you. He was in 
15 custody, then apparently on about the 4th of April 
16 when he had the conversation with Detective Dave 
17 Hansen that Hansen has testified to, is that correct? 
18 A . Yes. sir. he was. 
19 0. Does Mr. Telford smoke? 
20 A. Yes, sir., he does. 
21 0. Now, when was Mr. Dahlquist arrested on this 
22 matter and where did that arrest take place? 
23 A. On this particular matter Mr. Dahlquist was 
24 arrested, or a hold was placed on him. He was already 
25 in custody at the Weber County jail. That would have 
